Risk tolerance and myopic behavior - evidence from Finnish retail investors by Lehto, Juuso
Risk tolerance and myopic behavior
- evidence from Finnish retail
investors
Finance
Master's thesis
Juuso Lehto
2010
Department of Accounting and Finance
HELSINGIN KAUPPAKORKEAKOULU
HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
2 
 
Helsinki School of Economics 
 
Helsinki School of Economics     Abstract 
Master’s Thesis       March 4, 2010 
Juuso Lehto 
 
RISK TOLERANCE AND MYOPIC BEHAVIOR – EVIDENCE FROM FINNISH RETAIL 
INVESTORS 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether investors actually follow the 
investment advice given by their bank. The bank here is a major Finnish retail bank 
which gives investment advice to its private clients based on the data it gathers in its 
investment profile tool, as required by MiFID. The study focuses on comparing the 
asset allocations suggested by the bank to the ones chosen by the investors. 
 
This paper adds new important evidence about the behavior of investors and the 
functioning of the banks’ risk profiling methods under the MiFID regulations. The 
study provides a new dimension of investment horizon into the research and also 
includes longitude in the data for the first time regarding this topic. 
 
DATA 
The focus of the study is on private retail customers who have completed the 
Investment profile in the last quarter of 2008. The data set covers the true 
compositions of the customers’ investment portfolios at two dates: Dec 31, 2008 and 
Oct 31, 2009. The total amount of investors in the sample is 910. 
 
In addition to the information about the investment profiles and asset allocations the 
data includes demographic statistics such as age, gender and wealth. The trading 
activity of the investors is also studied. 
 
RESULTS 
The main finding of this study is that investors seem to clearly ignore the length of the 
investment horizon in their allocation decisions. Investors overweight equities in short 
horizons and underweight them in long horizons. The finding supports previous 
research on the myopic behavior of investors. Previous research finds that investors 
make investment decisions on much shorter intervals than their investment horizon 
would suggest.  
 
I also find evidence of disposition effect and market timing attempts by the investors. 
The results indicate that investors actively increased the weight of equities in their 
portfolios during the period. Some of the investors appeared to have increased the 
share of risky assets considerably more than others. The main characteristics of those 
investors included risk-averse risk profile and high trading activity. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Risk profile, risk tolerance, investment horizon, myopic behavior, disposition 
effect, MiFID   
3 
 
Table of Contents 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 9 
2 Literature Review ............................................................................................................... 11 
2.1 Saving Motives Hierarchy ........................................................................................... 11 
2.2 Behavioral Finance and Decision Making Theories .................................................... 13 
2.2.1 Mental accounting ................................................................................................ 13 
2.2.2 Prospect Theory .................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.3 Other Decision Making Theories ......................................................................... 16 
2.2.4 Loss aversion ........................................................................................................ 19 
2.2.5 Omission bias ....................................................................................................... 21 
2.2.6 Anchoring ............................................................................................................. 22 
2.2.7 Disposition effect ................................................................................................. 23 
2.2.8 Overconfidence .................................................................................................... 24 
2.2.9 Hyperbolic discounting ........................................................................................ 25 
2.3 Determinants of risk .................................................................................................... 26 
2.3.1 Age ....................................................................................................................... 26 
2.3.2 Gender .................................................................................................................. 27 
2.3.3 Wealth .................................................................................................................. 27 
2.3.4 Trading Activity ................................................................................................... 27 
3 Hypotheses ......................................................................................................................... 28 
4 Data and Methods ............................................................................................................... 30 
4.1 Data .............................................................................................................................. 30 
4.2 Methods ....................................................................................................................... 33 
5 Data Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 36 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................... 36 
5.2 Correlations Between Variables .................................................................................. 42 
4 
 
5.3 Analysis of the Allocations .......................................................................................... 45 
5.3.1 Risk profiles and investment horizons ................................................................. 45 
5.3.2 Trading activity .................................................................................................... 51 
5.3.3 Age ....................................................................................................................... 54 
5.3.4 Gender .................................................................................................................. 57 
5.3.5 Investment Wealth ................................................................................................ 60 
5.4 Regression Analysis .................................................................................................... 62 
5.4.1 OLS Regression – Comparison of the Risky Share in the Initial Allocation to the 
Bank’s Suggestion ............................................................................................................ 62 
5.4.2 OLS Regression – Comparison of the Risky Share in the Initial Allocation to the 
Final Allocation ................................................................................................................ 64 
5.4.3 OLS Regression – Comparison of the Risky Share in the Final Allocation to the 
Bank’s Suggestion ............................................................................................................ 65 
6 Findings and Conclusions .................................................................................................. 67 
6.1 Findings ....................................................................................................................... 67 
6.2 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 70 
6.3 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research ................................. 72 
7 References .......................................................................................................................... 73 
8 Appendices ......................................................................................................................... 78 
8.1 Appendix A – Graphs and Tables ................................................................................ 78 
8.2 Appendix B – Investment Profile Questionnaire ......................................................... 81 
8.3 Appendix C – Questions for Determining the Risk Profile ......................................... 85 
 
  
5 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. The prospect theory value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) ......................... 19 
Figure 2. The allocation proposals of the bank. The allocation depends on two variables:  
investment time horizon and the personal investment profile. ................................................. 31 
Figure 3. Age distribution with a breakdown by gender. ......................................................... 38 
Figure 4. Distribution of investors in different Investment profile categories, n=910 ............. 40 
Figure 5. Percentages of investors in the different risk profile categories ............................... 41 
Figure 6. Gender allocation in the different risk profile categories. ........................................ 42 
Figure 7. Average risky shares in the three different risk profile categories on December 31, 
2008. ......................................................................................................................................... 45 
Figure 8. Average allocations of the investors’ portfolios by risk profile categories and 
investment horizons on December 31, 2008. ........................................................................... 46 
Figure 9. The average risky share of assets in different risk profile categories on October 31, 
2009. ......................................................................................................................................... 47 
Figure 10. Average allocations of the investors’ portfolios by risk profile categories and 
investment horizons on October 31, 2009. ............................................................................... 48 
Figure 11. Performance chart for the main world equity indexes between December 31, 2008 
and October 31, 2009. .............................................................................................................. 52 
Figure 12. Percentages of investors in different investment horizons. .................................... 54 
Figure 13. The distribution of average investment wealth of the investors at different ages. . 55 
Figure 14. Average increase in risky share from Dec 31, 2008 to Oct 31, 2009. .................... 56 
Figure 15. Average portfolio turnover ratios for the investors at different ages. ..................... 57 
Figure 16. Share of males and females in each Investment horizon category. ........................ 59 
Figure 17. Breakdown of the risky shares for males and females at the beginning and at the 
end of the period. Figures are grouped by the risk profile categories. ..................................... 59 
Figure 18. Share of females and males in the different wealth deciles. ................................... 60 
Figure 19. Investors' average risky share on Dec 31, 2008 and Oct 31, 2009. Presented by 
wealth deciles. .......................................................................................................................... 61 
6 
 
Figure 20. Average risky share (RS) of investments on Dec 31, 2008. ................................... 78 
Figure 21. Average risky share (RS) of investments on Oct 31, 2009 ..................................... 79 
Figure 22. Distribution of investors by age into wealth deciles. .............................................. 79 
Figure 23. Share of investors with different risk profiles in each wealth decile. ..................... 80 
Figure 24. Portfolio turnover ratios of investors in different wealth deciles. .......................... 80 
 
  
7 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Demographic statistics of the sample group. ............................................................. 37 
Table 2. General statistics of investors in the Investment profile category: Safety First.. ....... 39 
Table 3. General statistics of investors in the Investment profile category: Value Minded.. .. 39 
Table 4. General statistics of investors in the Investment profile category: Return Focused. . 39 
Table 5. Correlations between variables. ................................................................................. 44 
Table 6. Summary of the RS statistics and the differences in the figures across risk profile 
categories and investment horizons.. ........................................................................................ 49 
Table 7. Summary of the investors' holdings in each risk profile category. ............................ 50 
Table 8. Summary of the investors' holdings. Grouped by investment horizons. .................... 51 
Table 9. Performance of the main world equity indexes between December 31, 2008 and 
October 31, 2009. ..................................................................................................................... 51 
Table 10. Summary of the investors’ trading activity during the studied period. .................... 53 
Table 11. Statistics of males and females. ............................................................................... 58 
Table 12. Results of the Linear Regression (OLS). Difference in the risky shares of the 
investors’ portfolios relative to the bank's suggestions and different independent variables. . 63 
Table 13. Results of the Linear Regression (OLS). Difference in the risky shares of the 
investors’ initial and final portfolios and different independent variables. .............................. 64 
Table 14. Results of the Linear Regression (OLS). Difference in the risky shares of the 
investors’ portfolios relative to the bank's suggestions and different independent variables. . 66 
Table 15. Summary of the results ............................................................................................. 67 
Table 16. Regional weights in investors' portfolios on December 31, 2008 and the 
performance of the index over the period until October31, 2009. ........................................... 78 
 
  
8 
 
List of Equations 
Equation 1. Risky share (RS statistic) ...................................................................................... 34 
Equation 2. Average Investment Wealth .................................................................................. 34 
Equation 3. Portfolio turnover ratio ......................................................................................... 34 
Equation 4. Difference in the risky share between the initial allocation and the bank's 
suggestion ................................................................................................................................. 35 
Equation 5. Difference in the risky share between the final allocation and the initial allocation
 .................................................................................................................................................. 35 
Equation 6. Difference in the risky share between the initial allocation and the bank's 
suggestion ................................................................................................................................. 35 
  
9 
 
1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to investigate the behavior of Finnish private investors by examining 
how well they follow the investment advice given by their bank and whether this behavior 
changes over time. I compare the asset allocations suggested by the bank to the ones chosen 
by the investors. I also examine the differences in the allocations at the time of taking the 
bank’s investment profile and in the situation ten months later. The bank’s advice about the 
allocation is based on two main variables: the investor’s individual investment horizon and 
risk profile. I first investigate how the investors’ initial allocations match those suggested by 
the bank and then test whether the allocations have changed in ten months time. In addition to 
the investment horizon and risks profile I focus on explaining the differences in the 
allocations by the following demographic variables: age, gender and wealth. I will also study 
the significance of trading activity in explaining the results. 
According to the MIFID regulations banks have to identify each investor’s risk appetite, risk 
tolerance and the purpose of the investment before giving any investment advice. This is done 
by conducting a questionnaire that maps the investor’s main goals in investing as well as the 
individual’s ability and willingness to take risk (the questionnaire in Appendix B). As a result 
the customer is categorized into one of the three different risk profile categories. The bank 
then suggests an investment plan that suits the investor’s risk profile and future investment 
goals. However, there are no studies yet that would have investigated with real customer data 
how well investors actually follow these investment plans. It is unclear whether investors 
actually adopt the bank’s proposal or just discard it.  
I use a sample of 910 Finnish bank customers who had taken the investment profile of a major 
Finnish bank during the last quarter of 2008. Firstly, I study whether these investors’ portfolio 
compositions match the allocation given by the bank’s investment profile tool at year-end 
2008. Secondly, I compare the composition of the investors’ portfolio on 31st of October 2009 
to the composition at year-end 2008 to find out whether they have deviated from the initial 
plan. Then I test again how closely the allocations at the end of the period match those 
suggested by the bank in the beginning. 
The major deficiency in the previous research has been the lack of longitude, i.e. the fact that 
the investors’ tolerance of risk has not been tested at separate points in time. My study will 
also provide new evidence and specific data about the meaning of investment horizon to the 
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individuals’ allocation decisions. An extensive study on investors’ risk profiles by Alanko 
(2009) builds on aggregate data and assumes investors to stick with their investment plans in 
the long term but in reality there is no guarantee of this. The portfolio allocation in one period 
only reveals the investor’s current perception of risk at the time of study. However, during the 
investment period the investor may deviate from the initial allocation because of changes in 
the attitude toward risk, in the valuation of the assets or due to actively re-weighting the 
portfolio by trading as the market conditions change. The change of attitude toward risk can 
be caused by a number of reasons. A sudden change in the market conditions is the most 
obvious one. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) call the behavior in which investors’ perception of 
risk varies depending on how often they monitor their investments as myopic loss aversion. 
Myopic loss aversion is a combination of two common behavioral biases of investors. Firstly, 
investors are loss averse, which means that they are much more sensitive to losses than to 
gains. Secondly, even long-term investors tend to evaluate their investments frequently.  This 
study investigates the investors’ true tolerance of risk and myopia by comparing the changes 
in their portfolio compositions over a period of ten months after making the long-term 
investment plan. 
The period during which the study was conducted was very challenging time for investors. 
Many asset classes saw remarkable rise and falls in both volatility and market values. 
According to many behavioral finance theories these are typically times when people fail to 
stick with their long term investment plans but instead fall victims of behavioral biases and 
make potentially bad decisions about their savings. And indeed, as I later report this clearly 
had an impact on the investors’ portfolios and behavior. Therefore it is particularly interesting 
time period for this kind of research. 
By studying the data I find evidence of investors deviating significantly from the allocations 
suggested by the bank both at the beginning of the period as well as at the end of it. My 
results strongly suggest that investors fail to consider the length of the investment period as an 
important factor in determining the share of equities in their portfolios. I also find evidence of 
the most risk-averse investors being most aggressive in increasing the share of equities over 
the studied period. The increases in the share of equities in their portfolios can be explained 
by active trading rather than simply rise in the value of the assets.  
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The study is structured in the following way. In the first section, I introduce the previous 
literature on the topic that has relevance for this research. In the literature part I have the main 
focus on theories that explain investor behavior and risky decision-making as well as the most 
common demographic determinants of risk. In the third section, after the literature review I 
present my hypotheses. The fourth part of the study focuses on explaining in detail the data 
and the methods used in conducting the research. The fifth section includes an extensive 
analysis of the data by using descriptive and statistical methods. Finally, I report my results 
and summarize the conclusions in the last section of the study. 
2 Literature Review 
In this section I introduce the main theories that have relevance for this study. I first explain 
the theory behind saving motives. Then I move on to discuss the main relevant topics in the 
field of behavioral finance. The last part of the literature review focuses on the determinants 
of risk for investors. 
2.1 Saving Motives Hierarchy 
In order to be able to analyze the saving behavior of the customers I will introduce some of 
the findings in the field of saving motives research. In regard to this study it is important to 
know the different reasons that people might be saving for. 
Keynes was the pioneer in the field of studying the saving behavior of people (Keynes 1936). 
He identified as many as eight different motives for saving. The list starts from precautionary 
saving and includes motives such as improvement of living standards and the feeling of 
independence to do things. His list was later replenished by Browning and Lusardi (1996) 
who added the down-payment motive, which means accumulation of assets to buy something 
expensive, such as a house or a car. 
Today economic psychology distinguishes four main reasons for households saving. These 
are called saving motives and they are normally followed by each other in a hierarchical 
order. The four motives can be broadly defined as follows, starting from the basic level: cash 
management, precautionary motive (saving for unexpected expenditures), down-payment 
motive (building-up assets for buying a house or a car etc.) and fourth wealth management. In 
this study the individuals mainly fall into the last three categories. So the primary reasons 
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why they invest are that they are either saving small amounts of money for precautionary 
purposes, or saving up for some major purchases, or that they have already accumulated 
surplus wealth that needs to be managed.  
Numerous studies have examined the importance of different motives to save after Keynes 
(1936). Katona (1975) find that in 1960’s in the U.S. people mainly saved to have buffer in 
case of sudden expenditures or emergencies, for retirement, for their children and to buy a 
house or durable goods. Interestingly, only few said they were saving to earn additional 
income or to leave an inheritance. Kotlikoff (1989) later find that approximately 30% of 
household saving in the U.S. can be explained by precautionary saving motives, particularly 
for old age. 
Among the first ones to propose a hierarchical structure of saving motives was Lindqvist 
(1981). He suggested a structure that has the need to have cash to deal with short-term 
financial goals at the first level. At the second level is the need to build up a reserve for 
precautionary reasons. At the third level is the need to accumulate assets for expensive 
purchases (down-payment motive) and finally at the top level is the need to manage the 
wealth accumulated.  
Xiao and Anderson (1993) incorporated Maslow’s (1954) theory of the hierarchy of needs 
and the behavioral life cycle hypothesis to their model and find that saving motivations vary 
between families and that they save according to different categories of mental accounting, 
which supports Thaler and Sefrin’s (1988) findings. Xiao and Noring (1994) find that families 
with little resources save primarily to survive from daily expenses. When the family’s 
resources increase, the motivation to save for emergencies also increases. At the highest 
income levels, motivations concerning retirement, children and improvement in the standard 
of living become important. 
Wärneryd (1995, 1999) continued the investigation of household saving behavior and was 
able to distinguish four different motives although Wärneryd stressed that people can be 
saving for several different reasons at the same time. The four motives are similar to the ones, 
proposed by Lindqvist (1981). At the first level, saving is just a continuous habit with no any 
specific goal. The second motive is a precautionary one, caused by the uncertainty about the 
future. At the third level is the bequest motive, i.e. accumulating wealth for the family and 
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inheritance. The fourth motive is the profit motive, which means that the person is expecting 
to get additional income from the investments in the future. 
Among the more recent literature on the topic is a paper written by Canova, Rattazzi and 
Webley (2005) who studied the saving behavior of British adults. They analyzed the persons’ 
goals that motivated them to save and identified altogether fifteen most important ones. They 
were able to find hierarchical structure between these goals. At the bottom of the hierarchy 
are the most concrete goals such as having a buffer in case of unexpected expenditures and 
saving for a better house or a vacation. At the higher levels, the goals are more of a 
psychological nature such as self-gratification and self-esteem. Unlike previous studies (Xiao 
& Noring, 1994; Lindqvist et al., 1978), Canova et al. find evidence that the structure of 
saving motives might not depend entirely on socio-economic variables. 
2.2 Behavioral Finance and Decision Making Theories 
When a person is making decisions about consuming, saving and investing, her decision 
making process is influenced by several different factors that the traditional economics does 
not take into account. Behavioral economics investigates human and social, cognitive and 
emotional factors to better comprehend the economic decisions that consumers and investors 
make. I will introduce here some of the most important behavioral finance models that play a 
role in the decision making process of investors. 
2.2.1 Mental accounting 
Mental accounting (Thaler, 1980) assumes that people categorize and frame their assets into 
separate groups depending on the source and use of assets. Ritter (2003) studied mental 
accounting and found that people tend to separate their decision-making when they should 
rather combine the different aspects in order to maximize their utility. According to the 
traditional expected utility theory people maximize their wealth and utility as a whole. 
However, in their everyday life people and investors like to separate their money according to 
what it is spent on and where it has come from. For example, people might save money by 
buying cheap food and avoiding higher quality ingredients when at grocery store but then go 
and spend much more on the same ingredients when eating at a restaurant. 
According to Thaler and Shefrin (1988) the main categories of mental accounting are current 
income, current wealth and future income. All of these are treated and valued in a different 
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way in people’s minds. For example, people often avoid spending their future income in 
beforehand even if the income was certain. Mental accounting can explain the tendency of 
people to on one hand keep their money on deposit accounts and on the other hand use credit 
for consumption at the same time. According to Shefrin and Statman (1984), also the 
popularity of dividends among investors can be explained with mental accounting. Investors 
like to use dividends in consumption rather than investing the money back to the stock market 
and thus receiving higher cumulative returns in the future. 
Narrow framing (Hirshleifer, 2001) is a phenomenon closely related to mental accounting. 
Narrow framing causes investors to be unable to see their investments as a portfolio but rather 
as a collection of different investments. Investors consider their investments as separate 
articles and the gains and losses incurred from the investments are considered independent of 
each other. This can explain the strong feelings of regret in case of a bad investment. Because 
of the mental separation of assets, investors fail to take into consideration the correlation 
between the different investments. This in turn may affect the way investors perceive the total 
risk level of their wealth.  
Rabin and Thaler (2001) describe mental accounting as a tendency for people to follow and 
estimate their financial transactions. Therefore investors observe the return and risk involved 
with the different parts of their wealth as separate matters, independent of each other. Thus 
high correlations between different assets can be easily left out of notice. Rabin and Thaler 
(2001) also notice that mental accounting affects the investors’ attitude towards risk. 
According to the traditional utility theory people are risk-neutral in small scale gambles 
because a rational person considers the risk from the perspective of her total utility. From this 
perspective the gamble is relatively small considering the total utility. However, empirical 
research has found that people do care about small gambles and act irrationally in such 
situations. If the person does not understand the magnitude of the risk relative to the weighted 
risk of her total wealth, taking the small gamble may seem like a bigger risk than it really is.  
2.2.2 Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory was first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as an alternative to the 
traditional expected utility theory when explaining the human behavior. According to the 
traditional utility theory people always maximize their own total utility. This means that in 
situations when a person has to choose between different alternatives he chooses the option 
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that gives him the greatest utility. One of the key principals in the theory is that utility 
maximization always takes place in the future and past events or experiences do not play part 
in it. However, several papers in behavioral finance have found (e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju 
2001a; Odean 1999) that past experiences and for instance past gains and losses do affect 
investors’ future preferences. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduce the decision frame. It portrays the decision making 
situation when there are several different alternatives all with different outcomes, actions and 
possibilities. The person making the decision has to form a picture of all of them. The theory 
has two decision making stages: (1) editing and (2) evaluation. People analyze the situation 
and the alternatives by identifying which options are identical and set a reference point. They 
consider the outcomes that are lower than this reference point as losses and the ones that are 
higher as gains. In the evaluation stage they evaluate the options that have been modified in 
their minds and then choose the one that gives the highest utility.  
2.2.2.1 Framing 
De Bondt (1998) find that the outcome of the decision is greatly affected by the actual 
decision making process. In decision making process the opinions and assumptions of the 
decision maker play a major role. Framing problem is closely related to the decision making 
process and it means that depending on how the option in a decision making situation is 
presented the answer can be completely different. So by presenting the same option in 
different ways can alter the decision the person makes. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) find 
that when presented with two problems with different options people separate the problems 
even when the outcomes of the problems might be interconnected. But if the problems were 
combined and presented at the same time the order of preference would be different.  
Classical example of the framing problem is to present alternatives to problems framed as 
either losses or gains. For example, a financial loss can be seen as it is without any 
compensation or it can be considered as an expense that one has to take in order to receive 
higher gains in the future (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Another famous example by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) is the Asian disease problem where presenting the same 
situation in two different ways (saving people or letting people die) gives dramatically 
different responses. In general, framing can take place whenever and wherever. For instance, 
depending on whether a payment that will be raised after some period, is called either as 
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discounted price at the moment (positive framing) or as a penalty fee if not paid quick enough 
(negative framing), has an effect on human behavior. (Gächer et al. 2009) The power of 
negative framing relates to the utility function of the prospect theory and the risk aversive 
behavior of people. 
Framing has at least two important implications for an investor. Firstly, as explained earlier, 
when two decisions are framed as separate matters the person making the decision may fail to 
see the combined effect of them. Therefore, investor can be persuaded to buy some fancy 
financial instrument that seems perfect when observed independently. However, when 
considered as part of the investor’s whole portfolio the product can turn out to be a bad 
investment due to high correlation with other assets in the portfolio or for some other reason. 
Secondly, investors can be very prone to the opinions and advice given by their advisors. 
Investors like all humans are susceptible to the way the matters are presented to them. Thus if 
the advisor does not bring up in the conversation some risks or fees that are related to the 
product, the investor may end up doing a worse decision than without the advice. Advisors 
can choose to present material, for example past performance charts that have been chosen in 
a self-serving manner, in order to convince the investor of some product. Also investors who 
decide intuitively rather than analytically are more vulnerable to framing (Steul 2006). 
2.2.3 Other Decision Making Theories 
Individuals have been found to create ways to facilitate decision-making in difficult 
situations. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) discovered that individuals often use the “1/n” rule of 
thumb when allocating their assets into different investments. This takes place when investors 
are given alternatives and they cannot decide the optimal allocation. The easiest way to 
allocate the money then is to just divide it evenly between the options. This is when framing 
and the role of the investment advisor is emphasized. Investment advisor can deliberately 
limit the product universe to few different products that are presented to the customer. 
Knowing that the customer cannot decide the allocation the money is likely to be divided 
evenly between the products that were already chosen by the advisor. 
Heuristics are also certain kinds of rules of thumb. Next I introduce the two most relevant 
heuristics in this research: representativeness heuristic and availability heuristic. 
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2.2.3.1 Representativeness Heuristic 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that people tend to generalize matters and make 
assumptions often on very little grounds. Representativeness heuristic means that individuals 
expect small samples to represent a larger population (Sample size neglect). People make 
decisions based on the available data and the estimated probability of the hypothesis. 
Probabilities are based on their previous experiences and knowledge about the matter. One of 
the main cognitive biases that is caused by this heuristic is the neglect of base rates. It means 
that people tend to focus on the evidence that seem important but considering true 
probabilities of events it is not. Thus individuals let certain matters that stick out to stray them 
away from rational thinking. For investors this may become relevant for instance in situations 
when they focus on the short-term historical returns of an investment product and fail to 
consider the long-term returns. Therefore, investors may regard a six-month performance of 
an investment product to represent also the expected future risk-return relationship. 
2.2.3.2 Availability Heuristic 
The availability heuristic was also discovered by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) in their 
research about individuals’ tendencies to form assumptions when making decisions. 
Availability heuristic means that people assume some event to be more probable than some 
other when the event has taken place quite recently or is just more easily brought to mind. 
People also fall victims of presumed association, which means that they tend to assess 
wrongly the likelihood of two events occurring together. Overall, when the event is in fresh 
memory it seems like it is more probable to take place than some other event, even if this was 
not true. Kahneman and Tversky (1983) tested this heuristic by asking people to recall 
English words that end with “ing” and words that have the letter “n” as the second last in a 
word. When people were asked to estimate which kind of words were more common they 
would say that the ones that end with “ing”. However, there are of course a lot more of those 
words that have “n” as the second last because all the “ing” words are also included in this 
group. The point is that those ones with just the “n” are a lot harder to bring to mind. Also 
investors are more certain that a downward trend can take place in the market if they have 
experienced it by themselves before. This may appear as pessimistic expectations about future 
returns and risk aversive behavior. This is why older people who have seen several ups and 
downs in the market may display more risk aversion than younger investors. 
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2.2.3.3 Life cycle investing 
According to the life cycle investing theory the allocation of assets between more risky and 
less risky assets should depend on the investor’s age as well as on her financial and human 
capital. The total wealth of a person is considered to be the sum of her current financial 
wealth and the discounted future value of her human capital. Also the flexibility of the 
investor’s human capital or working possibilities affects the allocation decision. I will 
investigate in this study whether the individuals display a tendency towards life cycle 
investing. 
According to the traditional portfolio theory developed by Harry Markowitz in 1952, 
investors make decisions in a static single-period framework. The main idea in life cycle 
investing is that the investor’s decision-making framework consists of several distinct time 
horizons. For example, a 25-year-old investor who expects to live to age 85, the retirement 
planning horizon is 60 years. As the investor ages, the planning horizon also gets shorter. 
(Bodie, 2003) 
The general approach to life cycle investing suggests that the optimal share invested in 
equities should decrease over life because labor income is considered to substitute riskless 
asset holdings.  The most famous rule of thumb has been presented by Malkiel (1996) who 
suggests an investment of a fraction in equities equal to 100 minus the investor’s age. Thus, 
the 25-year-old investor should invest 75% of her wealth in equities or other instruments with 
similar risk-characteristics.  
Cocco, Gomes & Maenhout 2005 conclude that with increase in age, labor income becomes 
less important part of the total wealth of the investor and hence it lowers the implicit risk-free 
asset holdings represented by it. The investor reacts to this by shifting his financial portfolio 
weighting towards the risk-free asset. However, age is not the only variable determining the 
optimal asset allocation for the investor. They also found that the probability of a disastrous 
labor income result substantially decreases the average allocation to equities. This emphasizes 
the fact that demographics and labor income affect the optimal asset allocation.  
As was mentioned before, also the level of total financial wealth and flexibility of working 
possibilities affect the allocation decision. By working more people can increase the share of 
risky assets in their financial portfolio. This is because the labor income can be considered as 
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a less-risky asset with bond-like characteristics. The flexibility of work means that people can 
adjust the amount of labor income by working more to cover the losses caused by riskier 
assets. This is often easier for young people who can affect their income level more easily 
than already retired investors. (Bodie, 2003) (Hichman et al. 2001) 
Life cycle investing implies that the individual must have reached such a phase in her life 
cycle that she is able to take financial risk. As explained earlier, the saving motives hierarchy 
aims to elaborate the different reasons for people to save, once they have reached a stage 
when they have liquidity surplus to invest. 
2.2.4 Loss aversion 
Loss aversion refers to the finding made by several researchers (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990) in empirical tests that people are more sensitive 
to decreases in their wealth than to increases. These studies have found that losses are 
weighted about twice as strongly as gains. Therefore, the disutility of losing 100€ is about 
twice the utility of gaining 100€. This effect is depicted in the Prospect theory by the 
curvilinear shape of the utility graph. 
 
Figure 1. The prospect theory value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
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The main difference to the traditional Expected Utility Theory is that the value function 
measures gains and losses, not absolute wealth. People estimate their losses and gains based 
on some reference value, which is often not the same as zero. Reference point can be any 
value that the individual uses as a benchmark when trying to find out whether he has gained 
or lost something. As can be seen in the Figure 1, there is a kink at the origin of the curve 
making the curve convex in the domain of losses and concave in the domain of gains. When 
moved to the left in the curve, the loss of value is higher than a similar move to the right 
would give as a gain. The curve becomes almost flat at both ends when the losses or gains get 
large enough. When the losses become large enough individuals tend to become more risk 
seeking and try to break even. The same happens in the domain of gains. When the gains 
become large enough the marginal utility of additional gain decreases.  
Individuals have also been found to overweight events with small probabilities and this also 
affects the experienced utility. For instance, people may buy lottery tickets and insurances 
where the probability of event is extremely low, but at the same time they are very 
conservative with their investments. Interestingly, people are risk-averse with moderate 
probability gains and small probability losses whereas with moderate probability losses and 
small probability gains they are more risk seeking. 
2.2.4.1 Myopic Loss Aversion 
Benartzi & Thaler (1995) and Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman & Schwartz (1997) have 
investigated a phenomenon called myopic loss aversion. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) offer this 
as an explanation to the famous Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) equity premium puzzle. The 
equity premium puzzle refers to the historical difference in the returns between equities and a 
risk-free asset, such as T-bills in the US. The puzzle about the equity premium is that it has 
been very large historically. Myopic loss aversion is a combination of investors’ high 
sensitivity to losses and tendency to evaluate their wealth frequently. Investors are said to 
have distinguished between the actual investment horizon and the frequency that the wealth is 
being monitored. Therefore, an investor who evaluates the value of his investments on a 
yearly basis behaves as if the investment horizon was only one year, regardless of the initial 
length of the investment horizon. Because of this, individuals tend to focus more on the 
returns than on the consumption and therefore the return variability plays a larger role in their 
minds than it should. According to Benartzi and Thaler (1995) investors are not willing to 
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accept the variability of the returns even if the short-run returns had not any effect on 
consumption. To compensate the return variability they require higher premium from equities.  
Thaler et al. (1997) tested the myopic loss aversion with investors and made some interesting 
findings. In their experiments, individuals who displayed myopic loss aversion were more 
willing to accept risks if they evaluated their investments less often. Investors who received 
most frequently feedback about their investments took least risk and earned the least money. 
Thaler et al (1997) stress that as the defined contribution pension plans are becoming more 
popular and people are pushed to take responsibility of allocating their pension savings by 
themselves, myopic loss aversion may affect these decisions significantly. They show that the 
decisions made by these investors may vary considerably depending on how their investment 
opportunities are described and the manner and frequency with which they receive feedback 
of their returns. This is a current topic also in Finland at the moment. There is strong pressure 
to give individuals more responsibility about their own retirement savings. Myopic loss 
aversion is also particularly important topic for this research because it may explain some of 
the results of this study.  
2.2.4.2 Regret Avoidance 
Loss aversion is also connected to behavioral bias called regret avoidance. Regret avoidance 
refers to a fact that individuals who make decisions that turn out badly have more regret when 
the decision has been more unconventional. For instance, buying a portfolio of stocks that 
turns down is not as painful when the stocks were blue-chip companies’ than when the stocks 
were some unknown star-up firm’s. This is because the losses on the blue-chip stocks can be 
blamed on bad luck rather than bad decision-making and cause less regret. (Bodie, Kane & 
Marcus, 2005) 
2.2.5 Omission bias 
Omission bias refers to a tendency of individuals to consider unwanted results of actions as 
more negative than unwanted results of inaction (omission). People would rather let things 
happen than be an active decision maker in a difficult situation, even when the result will be 
worse if no decision is made. Omission bias could be described as maintaining the status quo, 
an irrational barrier to change. It is a situation of omission against commission. Bazerman, 
Baron & Shonk (2001) argue that in the United States alone, twice the amount of lives could 
be saved out of those waiting for an organ donation, if the donation was considered as a 
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default for those eligible to donate. Johnson and Goldstein (2003) find that countries that 
consider the organ donation as a default have donation rates of 86 to 100 percent, as opposed 
to the figures in the U.S. of 4 to 28 percent.  
However, omission bias can also be a positive thing for an investor. It can protect the investor 
from making bad decisions in times of strong uncertainty about the future and help to stick to 
the initial investment plan. This is what may explain the popularity of regular saving 
agreements. It is much easier to sleep at nights when the individual does not have to make the 
decision about investing every month but can let the automatic subscriptions keep rolling 
regularly. This way the investor not only takes care of the diversification over time but also 
decreases the potential amount of regret that might occur in case the investment performed 
badly. This kind of timing strategy where the person invests some fixed amount periodically 
is also called dollar cost-averaging. 
2.2.6 Anchoring 
Anchoring refers to the tendency of individuals to anchor on some piece of information when 
faced with a decision-making situation. People develop estimates by starting from this piece 
of information, an anchor, and adjusting from it to yield a final answer (Epley & Gilovich, 
2001; Epley 2004). However, people do not adjust enough their answer away from the initial 
anchor. This happens when the anchor is developed by the decision maker himself. According 
to Mussweiler & Strack (1999) the existence of an anchor leads people to consider 
information that is consistent with the anchor instead of considering information that is 
inconsistent with the anchor. This happens eve though the inconsistent information may be 
more relevant for the decision-making situation. This kind of behavior where people try to 
look for information that is consistent with the anchor, takes place when the anchor is set 
externally instead of developing it by the decision maker him self. 
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) tested the bias with people and found that even when the test 
persons knew that the anchor was totally random and unrelated to the actual question it still 
had a dramatic effect on the decisions of these persons. Bazerman (2006) considers yearly 
salary increases that are based on some growth percentage as a good example of the 
anchoring effect. The anchor here is the last year’s salary. So even though all the employees 
were treated fairly by giving everyone an increase of 5% it does not mean that the relative 
levels of salaries are fair. The level of the new salary depends on last year’s salary. 
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For investors the anchoring bias may be particularly difficult to handle. It is a bias that is 
present in all decision-making situations. People may discard rational thinking when making 
investment decisions and rely too heavily on past information that is not relevant considering 
the future performance of an investment. Therefore it may feel tempting to consider the past 
performance of investments as a prediction of the future. Ritter (2003) found evidence of 
stock investors estimating the future performance of stock market based on the performance 
of the market during the last 100 days. The more conservative the investors are, the slower 
their opinions and estimates change. Anchoring may also explain why investors like to set 
some technical target prices for their investments. It is quite often that you hear someone 
saying that when a certain stock drops under or breaks through a certain price level the person 
says to buy or sell the stock. This of course does not make any sense unless there is some 
more in depth valuation related reason behind for the action. However, it is easier to anchor 
the price to some exact number and then adjust the decision making according to that. One 
case where anchoring effect may also occur is when at the time of making the investment, the 
investor has been shown the estimated average future return for the asset class. This is 
considered as an anchor that the investor compares the return of the investment to. When it 
comes to decisions concerning portfolio allocations, the allocation suggested by the bank may 
act as an anchor that the investor relates to. 
Anchoring is closely related to a phenomenon called reference dependency, which was 
introduced earlier in the chapter about Prospect theory. Reference dependency is the tendency 
of people to compare their current status to some reference point. For investors some clear 
reference points may be the purchase price of an investment or the price that has prevailed for 
a long time for some investment. Kaustia (2003) found evidence of investors considering the 
break-even price of a stock after direct and indirect fees as the reference point. However, 
there may be situations where the reference point is set based on the expected return or the 
return hoped for.  
2.2.7 Disposition effect 
Disposition effect is a behavioral bias found by Shefrin and Statman (1985). It refers to the 
tendency of investors selling too quickly shares whose prices have increased and hold on for 
too long to shares that have dropped in value. The reason for this is that people do not want to 
recognize the losses but do want to recognize the gains they have made. By selling the shares 
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whose value has dropped the investor would have to admit that he made a bad investment. As 
long as the losses are not recognized they exist only in theory. 
However, this kind of behavior is not very rational. It is much more tax efficient for the 
investor to sell the shares that have dropped in value because then those losses can be 
deducted from the gains that are possibly made later on. According to Constantinides (1983, 
1984) the volume of the recognized losses should increase towards the year-end. Also gains 
should be recognized when they have been made with shares that have high volatility and the 
gains are believed to be long-term. 
The effect can be explained with many of the previously introduced concepts in behavioral 
finance. The purchase price is often considered as the reference point for the investment. 
When the share price then drops below this level it causes a lot of regret and bad feeling for 
the investor. He becomes loss aversive and does not want to admit the bad investment 
decision. Shefrin & Statman (1985) explain the disposition effect with mental accounting. 
People find it uncomfortable to “close the account” in negative. It causes feelings of regret to 
them. 
There is evidence of strong variation in the trading volumes of stocks (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 
2001), mutual funds (Quill, 2001), and certain derivatives (Heath et al. 1999) that is caused by 
the disposition effect. These studies find that the trading volumes increase in bull market and 
decrease in bear market. In bull market, investors are more likely to sell their shares with gain 
relative to their reference point (e.g. purchase price or previously prevailed price level). In 
bear market the shares are more likely to be at a lower price level than the reference value and 
so investors do not want to realize their losses. 
2.2.8 Overconfidence 
Odean & Barber (2001) among others studied the tendency of investors to be overconfident 
when investing in stock market. They stress that overconfidence is particularly important to 
recognize when investing because the tendency has been found to come up in decision-
making situations that are particularly challenging and when it is hard to get proper feedback. 
Males especially tend to be more confident than females in these kinds of situations 
(Lundberg et al. 1994; Prince, 1993). Overconfidence has been also considered to explain the 
trading activity of investors. Odean & Barber (2001) find males to be a lot more active in 
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trading even though this did not help them achieve higher returns in the end. Several studies 
have found overconfidence to be harmful to investors because it is likely to lead to badly 
diversified portfolios and decrease the expected return due to trading. 
Overall, investors tend to be overconfident about their ability to predict future market 
movements. Investors also interpret the information differently depending on their point of 
view. For instance Daniel et. al (1998) find that on average investors overreact on information 
signals produced by themselves and under react on signals coming from the market. It has 
also been suggested that investors do not learn from their mistakes because they take the 
credit on successions but blame it on outside effect when they do not succeed (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988). This again only strengthens the overconfidence. Overconfidence may show as 
a tendency of certain investors to trade more actively and deviate more from the bank’s 
allocation than others. Past successes also may reinforce the behavior, making these investors 
take more risk in their investments that is recommended. 
2.2.9 Hyperbolic discounting 
Hyperbolic discounting is a concept introduced to behavioral economics by Laibson (1997) 
and Laibson & Harris (2001). In the traditional life cycle hypothesis people are assumed to 
make rational decisions about their consumption at different periods in their life, 
independently of their current status. According to the hyperbolic discounting concept, people 
who can be considered as hyperbolic discounters do not consistently rank their consumption 
at different periods of life, independently of their current status, but change their conceptions 
of each period depending on what their current position is. Future period payoffs have much 
higher discount placed on them than today’s payoffs. However, when the same payoffs are 
more distant in time, they are discounted more sensibly than the not-so-far-off payoffs. Green 
et al. (1994) find that the discount rate used in discounting for monetary rewards varies 
among other things across different age groups. 
The result of this is that people may seem to behave irrationally when making decisions about 
saving. They are happy to start saving for retirement, as long as it does not start today. This is 
supported by biological evidence that emotions affect more strongly immediate choices and 
calculation dominates for more distant ones. The concept of hyperbolic discounting can thus 
explain why for example people often wait too long to get started on saving for retirement. 
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2.3 Determinants of risk 
I will introduce here the literature concerning the typical variables that are used in 
determining individual risk attitudes.  
According to the findings of the latest study on Finnish investors’ risk tolerance by Alanko 
(2009) the risk tolerance of investors increases wealth and decreases with age. Also men were 
found to tolerate more risk than women. 
2.3.1 Age 
The evidence from most research papers on age and risk tolerance suggest that older people 
are on average more risk averse than younger people (e.g. McInish, 1982; Alanko, 2009). 
This is supported by the concept of life cycle investing which was introduced earlier in this 
study. According to the principles of life cycle investing people should gradually decrease the 
riskiness of their investment portfolio toward retirement because the saved money is meant to 
be used to provide extra income on top of the public pension. The tolerance for higher return 
and value variability is mitigated by shifting the allocation to safer asset classes. 
Donkers et al. (2001) studied risk aversion in a large survey with Dutch households and found 
that age affects negatively the willingness to take risk. Dohmen et al. (2005) studied the 
relation of age and willingness to take risk with a German sample group. They also found 
evidence for risk aversion increasing with age. However, the effect was stronger in sports and 
leisure than in financial matters. Riley and Chow (1992) suggest that risk aversion decreases 
with age until 65 years is reached and starts decreasing again after that. Hallahan et al. (2004) 
also find support for the non-linear relationship between age and risk tolerance by adding age 
squared as an independent variable into their regressions.  
Very recent studies about Finnish investors’ risk tolerance also support the view that risk 
aversion increases with age. This finding has been made by Haarala (2008) in her study with 
10.000 Finnish investors and Alanko (2009) in his very extensive study including risk profiles 
and true asset allocations of over 85.063 Finnish bank customers. Halko and Kaustia (2009) 
also find evidence for negative correlation between age and willingness to take risk in their 
Finnish sample. 
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2.3.2 Gender 
Gender and the willingness to take risk are linked together through overconfidence. 
Overconfidence has been found to be more common among men (Lundberg et al. 1994) and it 
leads men to take more risk in financial matters (Prince, 1993). Several studies have found 
similar results and most of the research on the topic support the hypothesis that males tend to 
take more risks than women. Hallahan et al. (2004) conclude that among a group of 
explanatory variables such as age, gender, marital status, education, income and wealth), 
gender has the most prediction power on risk tolerance.  
Also in Finland men have been found to be more willing to take risk with their invested assets 
than women (Haarala, 2008; Alanko, 2009). Kaustia and Halko (2009) find that men are 
generally more willing to take risks but when faced with a hypothetical investment decision, 
the difference between men and women respondents narrowed substantially.  
2.3.3 Wealth 
According to Friedman (1974) and Cohn et al. (1975) wealth and income are expected to 
correlate positively with individuals’ risk taking. A study by Riley and Chow (1992) with 
American households finds that an increase in income and wealth decreases the average risk 
aversion of households. As was already mentioned in the chapter about the Saving motive 
theory wealth may have an effect on the saving behavior. The higher the wealth the more 
versatile the purposes for saving are. Thus wealth is also expected to potentially affect the 
investment objective and horizon. Also Hallahan et al. (2004) report of strong positive 
relation between wealth and risk tolerance.  
Both Haarala (2008) and Alanko (2009) also find supporting evidence of this with Finnish 
sample groups. They also note that debt seems to have a clear positive effect on the investors’ 
risk attitudes. 
2.3.4 Trading Activity 
Trading activity is strongly linked to the concept of overconfidence. As was mentioned 
before, overconfidence can be considered as the main reason for investors to trade actively 
(Odean & Barber, 2001). On average it only causes investors to lose money on trading fees 
and not increase their returns relative to others. Trading activity is affected by the investors’ 
personal opinions about the near future market performance. Therefore, trading activity 
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increases in bull market and decreases in bear market. In effect, investors adopt a kind of a 
momentum strategy without necessarily knowing it. This was discussed more in the chapter 
about the Disposition effect. Not only internationally (Odean & Barber, 2001; Lundberg et al. 
1994; Prince, 1993) but also in Finland trading activity has been found to be highest among 
young male investors (Westerholm & Ollilla, 2003).  
3 Hypotheses 
The aim of this study is to investigate the behavior of Finnish private investors by examining 
how well they follow the investment advice given by their bank and whether this behavior 
changes over time. The bank has mapped each investor’s risk attitude and purpose of the 
investment in order to form a picture of the most suitable asset allocation for the individuals. 
Based on the information about the bank’s suggestions and the investors’ true portfolio 
allocations I try to identify characteristics of those investors not following the bank’s advice 
and find out patterns in the investors’ behavior.  I address the question by forming six 
hypotheses, which are analyzed in a dataset of 910 individuals. 
Previous studies by Alanko (2009) and Haarala (2008) have shown with extensive datasets of 
Finnish private investors that investors’ risk taking behavior can be predicted by their 
individual risk attitudes. Investors who are willing and able to take higher risk should also be 
more likely to hold more equities than those that are not willing or able to take risk. 
Hypothesis 1: Risk taking behavior can be predicted by individual risk attitude 
The traditional life cycle hypothesis and life cycle investing theory suggest that as the 
investment horizon decreases with age, so should the share of equities in investors’ portfolios. 
However, according to research on myopic loss aversion, investors distinguish between the 
actual investment horizon and the frequency that the wealth is being monitored (Benartzi & 
Thaler, 1995; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman & Schwartz, 1997 and Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). 
These studies suggest the frequency with which the investments are evaluated determines the 
investor behavior more than the actual investment horizon. Despite this, I assume that the 
share of risky assets in the investors’ portfolios increases with investment horizon, as 
suggested by the bank. 
 Hypothesis 2: Risk taking behavior can be predicted by investment horizon 
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Most of the existing research concerning age and risk tolerance indicates that these two are 
negatively correlated (Hallahan et al., 2004; Dohmen et al., 2005; Haarala, 2008; Halko & 
Kaustia, 2009; Alanko, 2009), although there is also some contradictory evidence from Riley 
& Chow (1992). I assume that as the risk tolerance is expected to decrease with age, this 
should be reflected also to the deviations from the bank’s allocation recommendations. Thus 
younger investors are expected to have higher share of assets in equities than suggested and 
older investors lower share than suggested. Therefore my hypothesis is following: 
Hypothesis 3: Risk tolerance decreases with age 
Previous studies about the effect of gender and wealth (Hallahan et al., 2004; Dohmen et al., 
2005; Haarala, 2008; Halko & Kaustia, 2009; Alanko, 2009)  have been unanimous about 
their effects on individuals’ risk tolerance. Here I also expect these tendencies to be reflected 
in the differences between the investors’ true allocations and the ones suggested by the bank. 
Thus the two following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4: Men are more risk tolerant than women 
Hypothesis 5: Higher wealth implies increased risk tolerance 
Studies by Thaler et al. (1997) on myopic loss aversion with investors suggest that individuals 
who display myopic loss aversion are more willing to accept risks if they evaluate their 
investments less often. On the other hand, investors who receive most frequently feedback 
about their investments take least risk. Also several studies on disposition effect (Grinblatt & 
Keloharju, 2001; Shefrin & Statman, 1985; Quill, 2001; Heath et al. 1999) and 
overconfidence (Odean & Barber, 2001; Lundberg et al. 1994; Prince, 1993) have shown that 
investors’ perceptions of risks may change over time. Therefore my last hypothesis is 
following: 
Hypothesis 6: Risk taking behavior may change over time 
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4 Data and Methods 
In this section I present the data set used for the study in more detail. I first describe the main 
data characteristics and how it was retrieved. Then I introduce the descriptive and statistical 
methods I use in doing the research. 
4.1 Data 
The data used in the study was obtained from the databases and an investor-profiling tool that 
is being used by a major Finnish bank. The investor-profiling tool is based on the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) regulations by European Parliament (2004). The 
directive requires financial institutions to understand the essential facts about their customers 
and to find out the customers’ preferences regarding their willingness and ability to take risk 
as well as the purpose of the investment. The tool is used by the bank’s investment advisors 
before giving advice on the customers’ investments and selling the bank’s investment 
products. Customer is asked to answer a series of questions concerning his or her attitude 
towards risk taking. The purpose of this is to find out the investor’s ability and willingness to 
take risk. The tool is set up in such a way that the investment profile is determined by the 
lower of the two values (ability and willingness to take risk). The full set of investment profile 
questions is reported in the Appendix A. There are three different risk profiles that the 
questionnaire can result to; Risk focused, Value driven and Safety first. A Risk focused 
investor accepts high risks in search for high returns. Investor who puts Safety first does not 
accept or is not financially able to handle variability in the returns. A Value minded customer 
is between these two risk-taker-profiles. 
After completing the questionnaire the customers are proposed an investment plan with a 
certain allocation of assets into different asset classes. I aim to find out whether the investors 
have chosen their initial allocation of assets according to the bank’s proposal. At year-end 
2008 this bank’s proposals for their customers’ investment plans depended on two main 
variables; investor risk profile and investment time horizon. There were four different 
categories of investment horizons and three different risk profile categories. The allocation 
was determined based on them so that there were altogether twelve different allocation 
proposals with varying equity shares.  
Figure 2 illustrates the different allocation proposals based on the two aforementioned 
variables. The share of equities in the suggested portfolio can vary significantly not only 
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because of the investment profile but especially due to the investment time horizon. The share 
of equities can vary in the Safety first group from 0% to 50%, in Value minded group from 
0% to 75%, and in the Return focused group from 0% to 100%.   
If the investor is going to need her invested money in less than two years the investment 
profile tool will automatically exclude any risky investments that could decrease significantly 
in value in a short period of time. This means that the share of equities will be 0% regardless 
of the investment profile. When the investor’s investment horizon is over 15 years the 
suggested share of equities is minimum 50% when the investor is in the Safety first category 
and 100% if the customer is in the Return focused category. This is the only situation that the 
investor is suggested to invest 100% of the assets to a risky asset class. 
 
Figure 2. The allocation proposals of the bank. The allocation depends on two variables:  investment time horizon and 
the personal investment profile. 
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Investors can have several investment objectives and thus several investment horizons for 
separate assets. This is how the bank takes into account the tendency of investors for mental 
accounting. For example, investor in the Value minded category might have two investment 
objectives: retirement saving (with long horizon) and saving for a new house (shorter 
horizon).  I have tried to tackle the problem with mental accounting in this study by 
discarding investors with different investment horizons from the sample. Thus, the data 
includes only individuals with one or more investment objectives that all have the same 
investment horizon. 
In my study I focus on private retail customers who have completed the Investment profile in 
the last quarter of 2008, i.e. between October 2008 and December 2008. I have gathered data 
about the compositions of the customers’ investment portfolios at two dates: on 31st Dec 2008 
and 31st Oct 2009. I call the former as the initial allocation and the latter as the final 
allocation. Corporations are excluded from the data set, which makes it consistent with 
previous studies. The total amount of investors in the sample is thus 910. 
In addition to the information from the investment profile the data includes demographic 
statistics such as age, gender and wealth. As a proxy for the wealth I use each investor’s 
average investment wealth during the period. Furthermore, I have gathered data about the 
trading activity of these customers during the studied period. I calculate portfolio turnover 
ratios for each investor and use the figure as a proxy for the investor’s trading activity.  
The bank is a large retail bank in the Finnish market with representation around the country 
and customers in all age and social classes. In addition to the traditional bank services such as 
credits, accounts, credit cards etc. the bank also offers an extensive range of different 
investment products at a competitive price. The data used in the analysis covers all the 
customers’ investment assets in the bank. The data includes the following products: mutual 
funds, straight investments such as bonds and equities, cash investments, insurance products, 
and structured products such as index loans. The data does not cover other possible assets in 
different banks or investment vehicles that are not bought through the bank studied in this 
paper. Also certain deposits and cash accounts are not included in the data. These are mainly 
so-called liquidity accounts that are used for daily cash management rather than for long-term 
investment purposes. 
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The setup in this study differs from the previous studies on Finnish investors’ risk attitudes 
mainly in three ways. First of all, I am the first one to have some longitude in my study. The 
period is not very long but enough to reveal patterns in the investors’ behavior. Furthermore, I 
also have a unique set of data that includes information about the investment horizons of the 
investors. This is particularly interesting because I am here able to combine the data about the 
investors’ true risk-taking with their long-term investment objectives and make comparisons 
between those figures. Thirdly, I focus on this study to explaining the differences in the risk-
taking suggested by the bank and the actual actions of the investors. 
I only use aggregated data in the study and do it so that no individual is identifiable from the 
figures. 
4.2 Methods  
I study the data set by testing whether the customers’ initial portfolio compositions match the 
allocations recommended by the Investment profile tool. Then I compare the allocations of 
the customers’ assets between the two dates, Dec 31, 2008 and Oct 31, 2009. I also test again 
how the true allocations differ from the bank’s suggestions at the end of the period. Then by 
adding in the exogenous variables I am able to analyze which factors have explanatory power 
regarding the deviations in the asset allocations. 
In the first part of the analysis I focus on confirming in descriptive methods that the results 
are consistent with the previous studies by Haarala (2008) and Alanko (2009) who had a lot 
bigger samples in their use and were able to make convincing statistical tests. After 
explaining the findings in descriptive methods I move on to making regression analysis with 
the variables. In the regression analysis I aim to find which variables actually explain 
statistically the differences in the allocations. 
In order to study the risk-taking behavior of the investors I calculate the risky share (RS) for 
each investor’s portfolio. Risky share was introduced by Riley and Chow (1992) as a factor in 
their Relative Risk Aversion Index (RRAI). The RS statistic is simply the ratio of risky assets 
to wealth, as used in the Arrow-Pratt coefficient for relative risk aversion.  The RS statistic 
was also used in a study by Alanko (2009) to measure the risk aversive behavior of Finnish 
investors. For simplicity and due to the limitations of the available data I define the risky 
assets as equity holdings. Equity holdings will comprise of both direct and indirect equity 
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investments. As a proxy for the wealth I use the average investment wealth of each individual 
during the period. The total investment wealth includes all customers’ known equity, fixed 
income, money market and other holdings of investment assets. This method is also in line 
with previous research on the topic. 
Risky share defined: 
ܴ݅ݏ݇ݕ_݄ܵ ܽݎ݁ ൌ ܴ݅ݏ݇ݕ_ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁_ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ _ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄  
Equation 1. Risky share (RS statistic) 
Where, 
ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁_ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ_ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ ൌ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ_ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ_2008 ൅ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ_ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ_20092  
Equation 2. Average Investment Wealth 
The share of risky assets implies the risk-aversiveness of the investor. The higher the RS, the 
more risk-tolerant the investor is, and vice versa. The change in the share of risky assets 
between the initial allocation and the final allocation indicates whether the investor has 
increased or decreased the riskiness of the portfolio after setting the initial allocation. As a 
result of the analysis I aim to identify the characteristics of those investors who are most 
likely to deviate from the bank’s suggestion and also from the initial allocation by either 
decreasing or increasing the riskiness of their portfolios. Positive change in the risky share 
indicates that the investor considers himself/herself being better able to tolerate the risk than 
estimated earlier and therefore is willing to increase the riskiness of his/her portfolio. 
I will also investigate the trading activity of each investor by measuring it with portfolio 
turnover ratios. This way I can estimate whether the changes in the allocations are caused by 
market movements or active participation of the investor.  
Portfolio turnover defined: 
ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ ൌ ݉ܽݔሼܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ_ܲݑݎܿ ܽݏ݁ݏ; ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ_݈ܵܽ݁ݏሽܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁_ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ_ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄  
Equation 3. Portfolio turnover ratio 
Where Total purchases are the overall value of security purchases in Euros during the period 
January1 to October 31 in 2009. Respectively, Total sales are the overall value of security 
sales in Euros during the period January1 to October 31 in 2009 
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In order to find out how independent the variables are from each other, I analyze them by 
taking correlations between each other. Later, I run a regression analysis of the variables in 
order to test statistically the significance of the different factors explaining investor behavior. 
I use linear regressions with ordinary least squares method in doing this. This method is used 
because the dependent variables can be expected to be random, normally distributed and 
possible to sort by values linearly. 
I use the following dependent variables in the regressions: 
 Difference in the risky share between the initial allocation and the bank’s suggestion: 
ܴ݀ܵଶ଴଴଼ି௕௔௡௞ ൌ ܴܵଶ଴଴଼ െ ܴܵ௕௔௡௞ 
Equation 4. Difference in the risky share between the initial allocation and the bank's suggestion 
 Difference in the risky share between the final allocation and the initial allocation: 
ܴ݀ܵଶ଴଴ଽିଶ଴଴଼ ൌ ܴܵଶ଴଴ଽ െ ܴܵଶ଴଴଼ 
Equation 5. Difference in the risky share between the final allocation and the initial allocation 
 Difference in the risky share between the final allocation and the bank’s suggestion: 
ܴ݀ܵଶ଴଴ଽି௕௔௡௞ ൌ ܴܵଶ଴଴ଽ െ ܴܵ௕௔௡௞ 
Equation 6. Difference in the risky share between the initial allocation and the bank's suggestion 
 
Where, 
 RS2008 is the true risky share in investor’s portfolio in the beginning of the period 
 RSbank is the risky share suggested by the bank 
 RS2009 is the true risky share in investor’s portfolio at the end of the period 
 
The independent variables used in the regressions are following: 
 Age is investor’s age in years 
 Age squared is quadratic age term 
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 Gender is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the person is male 
 Risk profile captures the risk attitude of the investor (1: Safety first, 2: Value minded, 
3: Return focused) 
 Investment horizon captures the length of the investment period as estimated by the 
investor (1: from 0 to 2 years, 2: from 2 to 5 years, 3: from 5 to 15 years, 4: over 15 
years) 
 Wealth is the total amount of investment wealth of the investor in EUR 
 Wealth (logarithmic) is a natural logarithm of wealth and used as a control method for 
the distribution of wealth 
 Turnover ratio is the portfolio turnover ratio of the investor during the studied time 
period and it is used as a proxy for the investor’s trading activity 
 
5 Data Analysis 
In this section of the study I analyze the data set by using quantitative and descriptive 
methods to find out evidence for or against the hypotheses. I will investigate the possible 
statistical dependencies between the chosen variables and present figures in graphs and tables 
to elaborate the key results of the analysis. I first examine the descriptive statistics to 
determine whether the sample group can be considered as a representative sample of a larger 
investor population. I investigate the true allocations of the investors in the beginning of the 
studied period, December 31, 2008 and at the end of the period, October 31, 2009. I also 
extend my study to regression analysis to investigate the statistical significance of the 
variables in explaining the differences between the investors’ allocations. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
The general statistics of the sample group confirm that the group can be considered as a 
representative sample of a larger investor population. The main statistics match findings of 
the previous research. Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the main demographic statistics of the 
investors. Table 1 includes data of all the investors and tables 2 to 4 present the same 
information by Investment profile categories.  
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Table 1. Demographic statistics of the sample group. Gender statistic, Males=1 and Females=0. In risk profile the 
categories Safety first, Value minded and Return focused are measured with figures 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
Investment horizon has a statistic from 1 to 4 that increases with the time period. 
 
The data suggests that average investor has an investment wealth of €165.528 and the 
person’s investment horizon is between 2 and 5 years. However, the median investment 
wealth is merely €22.030 euros. The average figures are distorted due to the fact that the data 
includes some investors with very large assets, for instance the maximum average investment 
wealth of over €36 million. Average investor holds most of his/her investments in other than 
equities (€5.675 versus €12.878), mainly in short-term fixed income investments. The gender 
distribution is fairly even with a slight majority (51%) being females.  
These figures are mainly in line with Alanko’s (2009) findings of average Finnish retail 
investors. There are some differences in the amount of investment wealth. In Alanko’s sample 
the average investment wealth was a little lower (€101.942) than in this study. On the other 
hand the median investment wealth was clearly higher (€37.000). I suspect this is because 
Alanko’s figures also include assets on liquidity accounts for daily cash management.  
As expected, customers in the sample group are reasonably old. The average age is 54,7 years 
and median 56,5. The youngest person is 17 years old and the oldest one almost 90 years. 
Figure 3 presents the age distribution by age groups. The age distribution is a similar to the 
overall age pyramid in Finland. It also resembles the distribution found by Alanko (2009). 
Mean StDev Median Min Max
Age 54,7 15,0 56,5 16,7 89,6
Gender 0,49 0,50 0,00 0,00 1,00
Risk profile 1,92 0,61 2,00 1,00 3,00
Investment horizon 2,65 0,85 3,00 1,00 4,00
Average investment wealth 165 528 1 298 011 22 030 25 36 252 142
Average equity investments 54 185 249 063 5 675 0 4 332 134
Average other investments 111 342 1 223 633 12 878 0 35 853 460
Turnover 37 017 211 307 500 0 3 695 112
All (n=910)
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Figure 3. Age distribution with a breakdown by gender. 
 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 report the same demographic information as Table 1 by Investment profile 
categories.  The data suggests that most investors in the Safety First category are older than 
average (60 years). On the other hand the category Return focused seems to consist of clearly 
younger investors (49 years) than the average. Also the average investment wealth is lowest 
in the Return focused category. Despite the lower investment wealth, the portfolio turnover of 
assets is higher in this group than in the other two. Turnover relative to the average 
investment wealth seems to increase with the risk attitude in all of the investment profile 
categories. So does the estimated investment period for the assets. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that the average equity holdings relative to the avg. investment wealth behave in the 
same way.  
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Table 2. General statistics of investors in the Investment profile category: Safety First. Gender statistic, Males=1 and 
Females=0. In risk profile the categories Safety first, Value minded and Return focused are measured with figures 1, 2 
and 3 respectively. Investment horizon has a statistic from 1 to 4 that increases with the time period.  
 
Table 3. General statistics of investors in the Investment profile category: Value Minded. Gender statistic, Males=1 
and Females=0. In risk profile the categories Safety first, Value minded and Return focused are measured with 
figures 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Investment horizon has a statistic from 1 to 4 that increases with the time period.  
 
Table 4. General statistics of investors in the Investment profile category: Return Focused. Gender statistic, Males=1 
and Females=0. In risk profile the categories Safety first, Value minded and Return focused are measured with 
figures 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Investment horizon has a statistic from 1 to 4 that increases with the time period.  
 
Most of the investors (62%) in the sample group are categorized into the Value minded group 
(n=567). The second largest group (24%) is Safety First (n=208) and the smallest one Return 
focused (n=135). The numbers are illustrated in Figure 4. The distribution is slightly skewed 
to the risk-averse direction. This is investigated in more detail in later but the aggregate 
Mean StDev Median Min Max
Age 59,5 14,6 61,5 19,5 89,4
Gender 0,42 0,50 0,00 0,00 1,00
Risk profile 1,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Investment horizon 2,12 0,88 2,00 1,00 4,00
Average investment wealth 100 713 439 891 22 030 82 5 099 578
Average equity investments 27 180 132 689 3 269 0 1 448 823
Average other investments 73 533 362 625 18 206 0 4 694 025
Turnover 14 125 65 646 300 0 816 562
Investment profile: Safety First (n=208)
Mean StDev Median Min Max
Age 54,3 14,8 55,9 16,7 89,6
Gender 0,48 0,50 0,00 0,00 1,00
Risk profile 2,00 0,00 2,00 2,00 2,00
Investment horizon 2,74 0,79 3,00 1,00 4,00
Average investment wealth 211 092 1 618 801 24 338 25 36 252 142
Average equity investments 65 391 296 646 7 295 0 4 332 134
Average other investments 145 700 1 533 454 14 009 0 35 853 460
Turnover 41 867 230 414 500 0 3 695 112
Investment profile: Value Minded (n=567)
Mean StDev Median Min Max
Age 49,4 14,3 50,6 22,1 84,2
Gender 0,63 0,48 1,00 0,00 1,00
Risk profile 3,00 0,00 3,00 3,00 3,00
Investment horizon 3,04 0,68 3,00 1,00 4,00
Average investment wealth 74 020 194 394 13 487 72 1 303 286
Average equity investments 48 729 142 181 6 991 0 1 037 467
Average other investments 25 291 81 957 3 578 0 713 589
Turnover 51 914 266 176 1 220 0 2 813 871
Investment profile: Return Focused (n=135)
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figures already indicate that the investors consider themselves as quite risk averse. This is in 
line with the existing research about Finnish investors (e.g. Alanko, 2009; Halko & Kaustia, 
2009; Haarala, 2008) 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of investors in different Investment profile categories, n=910 
 
Figure 5 reports the share of investors in each investment profile category by age. It is 
noteworthy that there are clear differences in the distributions depending on the age. The 
pattern suggests that the older the investors are the more risk averse they appear to be. The 
share of investors in the Return focused category declines with age. At the same time the 
share of investors in the Safety first category increases with age while the Value minded 
category dominates across the age groups. The results support many of the existing studies 
about the negative attitude towards risk increasing with age (Hallahan et al., 2004; Dohmen et 
al., 2005; Haarala, 2008; Alanko, 2009). Due to the smaller sample size the evidence is not as 
profound as in Alanko’s (2009) study although the results are consistent with their findings. 
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Figure 5. Percentages of investors in the different risk profile categories 
 
There are also some noticeable gender differences between the risk profile groups. Figure 6 
depicts the share of females and males in the different risk profile categories. Overall, the 
distribution is even with 51 % females and 49 % males. However, when observing the 
distributions in the different risk profile categories there are apparent differences between the 
groups. In the Return focused group a clear majority of the investors are male. The 
distribution is even again in the Value minded category but then changes in the Safety first 
category. Safety first category has close to the same majority of females as was with males in 
the Return focused category. In this sample group females thus appear to be more risk averse 
than males and males more risk seeking than females. This supports the findings made in 
numerous previous studies on the topic (Hallahan et al., 2004; Dohmen et al., 2005; Haarala, 
2008; Alanko, 2009). Those studies have found similar differences in the risk attitudes of 
males and females, i.e. females being more risk averse than males. 
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Figure 6. Gender allocation in the different risk profile categories. 
 
5.2 Correlations Between Variables 
In order to investigate how the different variables are dependent of each other I have gathered 
a correlation matrix in Table 5. In addition, to the correlations between age, gender, risk 
profile and investment horizon I have included the following variables: turnover ratio, 
average investment wealth, risky share suggested by the bank, risky share in 2008, risky share 
in 2009, the difference between risky share in 2008 and the bank’s suggestion, the difference 
between risky share in 2009 and the bank’s suggestion and finally the change in the risky 
share from 2008 to 2009.  
There appears to be a fairly strong negative correlation between age and the risk profile. This 
means that the older the person is the higher the probability that he/she is in a more risk-
averse investment profile category. This is also reflected in the negative correlation between 
age and the risky share suggested by the bank. There is also a relation between gender and 
risk profile. The positive correlation means that males are more likely to be in the more risk-
tolerant risk profile category. Therefore, the share of females is higher in the Safety first 
group and lower in the return focused category.  
An interesting figure is the high positive correlation between risk profile category and 
investment horizon. This indicates that the longer the time horizon for the investments the 
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higher the probability that the investor belongs to a higher risk investment category. This is 
intriguing because the investment profile and the time horizon for the investments should be 
independent variables. Investment profiling aims to map the investor’s general appetite and 
tolerance towards risk. The investment horizon is dictated by the investment objectives, i.e. 
purpose of the investment. However, it seems based on these figures that the two variables 
appear to be strongly interdependent. It is possible that the investment purpose affects the way 
the investors consider they can tolerate the risk. 
Some of the most significant observations are the correlations between risk profile and risky 
shares, and investment horizon and risky shares. The risky share suggested by the bank 
correlates more highly with the investment horizon than with the risk profile. This means that 
the bank considers the time period of the investment as a more important factor in 
determining the risky share than the personal risk profile. However, when observing the 
correlations of the actual risky share chosen by the investors it seems that the risk profile has 
a lot higher correlation than the investment horizon. In effect, the investors discard the 
purpose and expected length of the investment and rely more on their personal risk attitude 
when determining the risk level of their portfolio.  
When it comes to the difference between the true allocation of assets and those suggested by 
the bank it seems that there is a high negative correlation with the investment horizon as well 
as with the risk profile. This suggests that the larger the difference between the true allocation 
and the one suggested by the bank, the shorter the investment horizon. In other words, 
investors with short investment horizons have higher share of investment in risky assets than 
suggested by the bank and vice versa with investors in the long horizon categories. Also risk 
profile has a significant negative correlation with the difference to the bank’s suggestion. This 
indicates that investors in the more risk-averse risk profile categories have higher risky share 
than suggested by the bank. 
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5.3 Analysis of the Allocations 
In this part of the Analysis section I investigate the different variables in more detail by 
measuring investment allocations of the investors first at the beginning of the studied period 
and then at the end of the period. I also compare these figures to the allocation suggested by 
the bank and see if I can find systematic patterns in the results. 
5.3.1 Risk profiles and investment horizons 
At year-end 2008 the investors held on average 32% of their investment assets in a risky asset 
class. As expected, the risky share depended on the individual’s risk profile. In the Safety first 
category the figure for risky share was on average 18% whereas in the Value minded group it 
was 32% and in the Return focused category 55%. Figure 7 illustrates these differences. This 
supports the findings in previous studies, namely by Alanko (2009) and Haarala (2008) that 
Finnish investors tend to allocate their money in low-risk assets. Also the evidence that the 
risky share increases with risk profile was suggested by the two earlier studies as well. 
 
Figure 7. Average risky shares in the three different risk profile categories on December 31, 2008. 
Figure 8 shows the differences in the risky share by investment horizon and risk profile 
categories. The risky share seems to be relatively constant across the investment horizons in 
each risk profile category. In the Safety first and Return focused categories the risky share is 
actually lower when the intended investment period is over 15 years than when the 
investment horizon is from zero to two years. However, the sample size in the latter one is 
only 2 individuals, which makes it statistically unreliable figure. The differences between the 
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highest and lowest figure for risky share in Safety first group is 11 percentage points, in the 
Value minded group 20 percentage points and in the Return focused group 12 percentage 
points when the figures for RF, 0-2 years are discarded.  
 
 
Figure 8. Average allocations of the investors’ portfolios by risk profile categories and investment horizons on 
December 31, 2008. 
 
Allocations at the end of the studied period on October 31, 2009 reveal that at this point 
investors held on average 42% of their investments in risky assets. The average share of risky 
assets in the different risk profile categories were 28% for Satefy first, 43% for Value minded 
and 61% for Return focused investors. Figure 9 illustrates the differences. The share of risky 
assets in the portfolios has increased by almost one third in a relatively short time period of 10 
months. Even though the phenomenon is apparent in each of the risk profile categories there 
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are significant differences between the groups. As the Table 7 reports, the risky share has 
increased in relative terms the most in the Safety first group and the least in the Return 
focused group.  
 
Figure 9. The average risky share of assets in different risk profile categories on October 31, 2009. 
Figure 10 shows the average share of risky assets by risk profile categories and investment 
horizons. The pattern is very similar to the one presented in figure 8. Even though the risky 
shares have increased in all of the groups there are no great differences between the 
investment horizons in each risk profile category. I discard the group with Return focused risk 
profile and investment period of zero to two years due to the small sample size (n=2). The 
largest differences in the RS figures in each risk profile category are: Safety first 6 percentage 
points, Value minded 16 percentage points and Return focused 7 percentage points. 
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Figure 10. Average allocations of the investors’ portfolios by risk profile categories and investment horizons on 
October 31, 2009. 
 
In Table 6 I have summarized the sample groups’ individuals’ risky shares of their portfolios 
on December 31, 2008 (Initial allocation) and October 31, 2009 (Final allocation). The table 
also includes comparisons to the allocation suggested by the bank’s investment profile tool in 
each group.  
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Table 6. Summary of the RS statistics and the differences in the figures across risk profile categories and investment 
horizons. The changes are reported both in percentage points and percentages. Columns ‘Initial-Bank’ report the 
differences in the risky share between investors’ initial portfolios and bank’s suggestions. Similarly columns ‘Final-
Bank’ report the differences between final allocation and bank’s suggestion as well as ‘Final-Initial’ report the 
difference between final allocations and initial allocations. 
 
Comparisons between the allocations proposed by the bank, allocation chosen at the 
beginning of the investment period and the allocation at the end of the studied period show 
considerable variations in the RS statistics. There are some noticeable patterns in the studied 
figures. Comparison between the allocations proposed by the bank and the ones initially 
chosen by the customers reveal that the investors categorically overweight risky assets in 
short investment periods and underweight them in the domain of longer investment periods. 
The same appears to occur also with the final allocations. Overall, the risky share has 
increased in all of the sample groups substantially. The only exception is the group of two 
Return focused investors with an investment horizon of 0-2 years. 
Table 7 reports summarized information about the investors’ holdings on an aggregate level. 
Altogether the investors have increased the risky share of investments in their portfolios by 
30% in relative terms from the end of year 2008 to the end of October 2009. The largest 
relative increases in the RS figure have taken place among the supposedly most risk averse 
investors, namely in the Safety first risk profile category (49%). The second largest change 
has taken place among the Value minded investors (34%) and perhaps surprisingly the 
smallest change in relative terms was in the Return focused category (10%). The statistics 
also show that there seems to be clear overweighting of risky assets among the supposedly 
most risk-averse investors when compared to the suggestion by bank. Then again the 
supposedly least risk-averse investors in the Return focused group underweight risky assets in 
their portfolios. Overall, the difference in the RS statistic to the bank’s suggested risky share 
Inv. Profile Inv. Horizon
. 
Ho
Gro
ups
Sample 
size
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proposal
Initial 
allocation
Final 
allocation
Absolute 
difference
Relative 
difference
Absolute 
difference
Relative 
difference
Absolute 
difference
Relative 
difference
0-2 years 1 1 54 0 % 16 % 26 % 16 % 26 % 10 % 65 %
2-5 years 2 2 91 0 % 20 % 29 % 20 % 29 % 9 % 42 %
5-15 years 3 3 47 25 % 21 % 29 % -4 % -16 % 4 % 15 % 8 % 38 %
over 15 years 4 4 16 50 % 10 % 23 % -40 % -79 % -27 % -55 % 12 % 118 %
0-2 years 1 5 26 0 % 20 % 32 % 20 % 32 % 11 % 56 %
2-5 years 2 6 192 10 % 28 % 39 % 18 % 179 % 29 % 291 % 11 % 40 %
5-15 years 3 7 251 50 % 40 % 48 % -10 % -21 % -2 % -4 % 8 % 21 %
over 15 years 4 8 98 75 % 25 % 42 % -50 % -67 % -33 % -44 % 18 % 71 %
0-2 years 1 9 2 0 % 72 % 34 % 72 % 34 % -38 % -53 %
2-5 years 2 10 22 25 % 46 % 55 % 21 % 86 % 30 % 120 % 9 % 19 %
5-15 years 3 11 79 75 % 58 % 62 % -17 % -22 % -13 % -17 % 4 % 7 %
over 15 years 4 12 32 100 % 52 % 62 % -48 % -48 % -38 % -38 % 10 % 19 %
Risky share of investments
Initial - Bank Final - Bank Final - Initial
Safety first
Value 
minded
Return 
focused
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has increased from -4% to 5%. The total investment wealth increased from 126M€ to 175M€ 
which almost entirely came from the increase in risky assets. 
Table 7. Summary of the investors' holdings in each risk profile category. Avg. difference in RS, 2008-bank reports 
the average difference in the share of equities between investors’ portfolios and the bank’s allocation suggestions 
(percentage points). The figure 2008 reports the situation at the beginning of the period and 2009 at the end of the 
period. Relative increase reports the percentage increase in the share of equities. 
 
Table 8 presents the same information as Table 7 by grouping the investors according to their 
investment horizons. The differences across the groups are evident. Individuals in the 
categories 1 and 2 have strong overweighting of risky assets in their portfolios whereas 
investors with longer investments objectives clearly underweight the risky share suggested by 
the bank. The relative change in the risky share from the year-end 2008 to the end of October 
2009 appears to be strongest among those investing for the shortest and the longest time 
periods. This indicates that the investors in those groups may be more aggressive in adjusting 
their portfolio weights than the other investors on average. The risky share should increase 
with investment horizon, of which I find only weak evidence. The smallest RS statistic can be 
found in Investment horizon 1, followed by Investment horizon 2. However, the figure for 
Investment horizon 3 is higher than for Investment horizon 4. The order is same in 2008 and 
2009. 
All (n=910)
Safety First 
(n=208)
Value 
Minded 
(n=567)
Return 
Focused 
(n=135)
Total assets, Dec 31 2008 126 361 518 15 614 892 104 094 658 6 651 968
Risky assets, Dec 31 2008 29 532 955 3 027 074 22 760 408 3 745 473
Other assets, Dec 31 2008 96 828 563 12 587 818 81 334 250 2 906 495
Average risky share, Dec31 2008 0,32 0,18 0,32 0,55
Total assets, Oct 31 2009 174 898 567 26 281 833 135 283 217 13 333 517
Risky assets, Oct 31 2009 69 084 542 8 279 820 51 393 413 9 411 309
Other assets, Oct 31 2009 105 814 025 18 002 013 83 889 804 3 922 208
Average risky share, Oct 31 2009 0,42 0,28 0,43 0,61
Avg. difference in RS, 2008-bank -4 % 9 % -6 % -16 %
Avg. difference in RS, 2009-bank 5 % 18 % 5 % -11 %
Relative increase in the risky share 
from 2008 to 2009
30 % 49 % 34 % 10 %
Investment wealth
December 
31, 2008
October 
31, 2009
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Table 8. Summary of the investors' holdings. Grouped by investment horizons. Avg. difference in RS, 2008-bank 
reports the average difference in the share of equities between investors’ portfolios and the bank’s allocation 
suggestions (percentage points). The figure 2008 reports the situation at the beginning of the period and 2009 at the 
end of the period. Relative increase reports the percentage increase in the share of equities. 
 
5.3.2 Trading activity 
There are two factors affecting the increase in the risky share: increase in the valuations of 
risky assets relative to other assets and the investors’ active participation in the increase of 
risky share by trading. It is out of scope of this study to calculate the true time-weighted 
return figures for each investor’s entire portfolio based on their holdings during the year and 
taking into account the money paid in and out of their custody accounts. However, as a proxy 
of the magnitude of the effect that the general positive trend in the stock market has had on 
the investors’ portfolios I have summarized the performance of the main equity indexes 
during the period in Table 9 and Figure 11. Overall, the valuations in the stock market 
increased by 13,2% in the developed countries and by 51,9% in the emerging countries. In 
Finland the increase was relatively high (25,2%). Also the US market performed better 
(15,5%) than the European (12,9%) and Japanese (10,6%).  
Table 9. Performance of the main world equity indexes between December 31, 2008 and October 31, 2009. Increase in 
the value of the index points in percentages. 
 
 
Investment 
horizon 1
Investment 
horizon 2
Investment 
horizon 3
Investment 
horizon 4
Total assets, Dec 31 2008 2 516 588 22 889 586 93 528 238 7 935 816
Risky assets, Dec 31 2008 375 214 7 131 555 19 574 575 2 554 856
Other assets, Dec 31 2008 2 141 374 15 758 030 73 953 663 5 380 960
Average risky share, Dec31 2008 0,18 0,27 0,41 0,29
Total assets, Oct 31 2009 3 532 960 34 879 664 122 040 633 15 457 607
Risky assets, Oct 31 2009 867 952 16 863 192 43 518 308 8 211 521
Other assets, Oct 31 2009 2 665 008 18 016 473 78 522 325 7 246 086
Average risky share, Oct 31 2009 0,28 0,37 0,49 0,45
Avg. difference in RS, 2008-bank 18 % 19 % -11 % -49 %
Avg. difference in RS, 2009-bank 28 % 29 % -4 % -33 %
Relative increase in the risky share 
from 2008 to 2009
51 % 38 % 19 % 53 %
Investment wealth
December 
31, 2008
October 
31, 2009
MSCI EM OMXH Cap S&P 500 MSCI World DAX NIKKEI225
51,9 % 25,2 % 15,5 % 13,2 % 12,9 % 10,6 %
Index performance
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Figure 11. Performance chart for the main world equity indexes between December 31, 2008 and October 31, 2009. 
I listed the different equity categories by regions and included the weights of the investors’ 
holdings on December 31, 2008. I also calculated a rough estimate of the total weighted 
return of the different markets. Assuming that the investors had kept the same regional 
allocations throughout the period, the return would have been 23,7 % (Table 16, Appendix 
A).  
In order to investigate whether the investors have actively increased the share of risky assets 
in their portfolios by trading I have summarized data about their trading activity between 
January 1, 2009 and October 31, 2009 in Table 11. The aggregated data suggests that during 
this period investors bought 57,2% more equities than sold (€15,2M bought, €9,6M sold). 
They also sold 3,9% more other investments than bought them during the period (€12,8M 
bought, €13,4M sold). Based on the median figures the most common way of trading was 
buying equities. The figures suggest that investors actively allocated more funds into risky 
assets during the ten months although most of the increase in the risky assets has come from 
the increase in the valuations of stocks. Also the difference between the purchases and sales 
of equities cannot be solely explained by the sale of other assets. It is likely that investors 
have financed the purchases of equities with funds that come outside of this data. The 
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possible sources for the money include salary income, money held in short-term deposits and 
liquidity accounts as well as assets in other banks. 
Table 10. Summary of the investors’ trading activity during the studied period. 
 
Based on the information about the aggregate regional allocations and the investors’ trading 
activity I conclude that there is still some unexplained growth in the assets that does not show 
in the data. The most likely explanation is that the investors have invested into equities that 
have grown in value by more than the market indexes would suggest. 
 
  
Total Mean Median StDev
Equity purchases 15 160 199 24 452 300 114 770
Other purchases 12 864 486 20 749 90 82 402
Total purchases 28 024 684 45 201 1 075 166 093
Equity sales 9 643 869 15 555 0 92 986
Other sales 13 369 107 21 563 0 175 538
Total sales 23 012 976 37 118 496 175 538
Trades (n=620)
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5.3.3 Age 
As was mentioned in the earlier chapters, there seems to be a negative correlation between 
age and risk profiles. Figure 4 illustrated this tendency. According to the results there is also a 
negative correlation between age and investment horizon. This means that the older the 
investor is the shorter the expected time period for the investments. This is shown graphically 
in Figure 12. The pattern is not quite as clear as with the risk profiles but still noticeable. This 
provides support for the concept of life cycle investing. In life cycle investing investors’ 
decision-making framework consists of several time horizons. According to the theory the 
investment horizon depends on the investor’s age. As the investor ages, the planning horizon 
also gets shorter, which is quite logical because the person gets closer to the retirement age 
and probably wants to decrease the riskiness of the portfolio along the way. In my sample the 
younger investors are much more likely to say their investment horizon to be over 15 years 
than the older investors. Most of the investors fall into the two middle categories: 2-5 years 
and 5-15 years. It might be that most of the investors do not pay much time thinking about the 
length of their investment horizon and choose one of the middle groups on average.  
 
Figure 12. Percentages of investors in different investment horizons. 
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In Figure 13 I have presented the average investment wealth of the investors by age groups. 
Investors under the age of 40 have considerably less investable assets than the older 
generations. However, the trend turns downward again after around the age of 60. This is very 
close to the general retirement age in Finland. The data would thus suggest that the assets of 
these investors start decreasing after they have reached the retirement age that probably many 
of them have been saving for. This discovery also supports the life cycle investing theory. The 
investors seem to truly accumulate investment assets from 40 years onwards, until their 
retirement. After this they start using the savings to provide for income. 
 
Figure 13. The distribution of average investment wealth of the investors at different ages. 
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When examining the true risk taken by the investors I find some evidence of a similar risk-
aversion behavior as Riley and Chow (1992) and more recently Alanko (2009) with Finnish 
data. Figure 20 (Appendix A) illustrates the RS statistics among the investors at different 
ages. Even though the investment horizon and risk profile tend to be on the more risky side 
for the young investors, this does not show in their risk-taking behavior. The actual risk taken 
seems to be even a little less than among the middle-aged investors. After a certain point the 
trend line starts sloping downward again, suggesting that the risky share of investments in the 
investors portfolios starts declining with age.  
However, the evidence seems quite weak because, the situation has changed during the period 
examined here (Figure 21, Appendix A). It appears that the distribution can vary considerably 
over time. Investors in the young-end of the distribution have increased the share of risky 
assets in their portfolios considerably more than the older investors who have been more 
cautious in their moves. It may be that those investors with higher level of wealth in absolute 
terms are more conservative with the allocation changes in their portfolios. Investors with 
smaller assets behave more aggressively in terms of increasing the risky share of investments. 
Figure 14 illustrates the change in the share of risky assets in the investors’ portfolios. The 
most radical increases in the share of risky assets have taken place with young investors. 
 
Figure 14. Average increase in risky share from Dec 31, 2008 to Oct 31, 2009. 
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In order to examine how actively the investors managed their portfolios during the period I 
have constructed data of their trading activity. Figure 15 shows the negative correlation 
between age and the average portfolio turnover ratio. Even though the correlation figures are 
fairly weak, there seems to be a connection between the trading activity of investors and the 
aggressiveness to make allocation changes in the portfolio. 
 
Figure 15. Average portfolio turnover ratios for the investors at different ages. 
 
5.3.4 Gender 
According to the existing research on differences in the risk-attitudes of males and females, 
the latter have been found to be by far more risk-averse on average. My evidence also 
supports this view. As I already mentioned earlier, women clearly dominate the risk profile 
categories associated with least risk, i.e. Value Minded and particularly Safety first. Table 11 
introduces some of the findings in the data that point to the same direction. The aggregated 
average risky share figure is consistently higher for males than for females, regardless of the 
point or means of measurement. However, despite these differences it seems that both groups 
have increased the share of risky assets quite evenly during the period. Also the difference to 
the suggested allocation by the bank indicates that there are no big behavioral differences 
between the genders in this regard. Men deviate only marginally more from the bank’s 
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allocation. The average investment wealth is higher among males than females, which is 
normal in this kind of sample. Males are also more active in trading their securities. However, 
the trading activity figure does not seem to have a clear connection with the average increase 
in the share of risky assets.  
Table 11. Statistics of males and females. 
 
In addition to dominating the most risk-averse risk profile categories, women also seem to 
clearly outnumber males in the investment horizon category with the shortest expected 
investment time period, Investment horizon 1 (Figure 16). When taking into account the 
larger number of females in the sample, there seems to be a tendency of males being majority 
the longer the investment horizon, and vice versa with females. It may indicate that females 
feel uncomfortable with investing for a longer period and regard the savings to be meant for 
more short-term objectives. Males on the other hand might be more willing to invest their 
money for a longer time period in search for higher return and then trade actively during the 
investment period. However, there was no large difference between the average increases in 
the risky shares. So the more active trading of males does not seem to lead to relatively higher 
risk than with females when compared to the starting situation. Rather it seems that males 
choose the more risky allocation already in the beginning and trade without changing the 
allocation. 
Mean Median StDev Mean Median StDev
Average investment wealth 191 394 32 071 644 258 140 991 16 825 1 700 464
Turnover ratio 0,583 0,038 4,249 0,458 0,020 2,705
Risky share 2008 35 % 26 % 31 % 30 % 25 % 28 %
Risky share 2009 46 % 46 % 29 % 39 % 38 % 25 %
Average increase in risky share 11 % 4 % 26 % 9 % 2 % 22 %
Difference in RS, 2008-bank -5 % 0 % 37 % -4 % 0 % 38 %
Difference in RS, 2009-bank 6 % 3 % 35 % 5 % 4 % 35 %
Males Females
Gender statistics
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Figure 16. Share of males and females in each Investment horizon category. 
Figure 17 shows the average risky shares for males and females in the different risk profile 
categories at the beginning of the period and at the end of the period. There are no large 
differences between the categories. Males have consistently higher risky shares in all the 
groups except in Safety first where females have a higher figure for the initial allocation. 
 
Figure 17. Breakdown of the risky shares for males and females at the beginning and at the end of the period. Figures 
are grouped by the risk profile categories. 
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5.3.5 Investment Wealth 
I also study the effect wealth has on investor behavior and attitude towards risk. In order to do 
this I have divided the investors into deciles based on their investment assets. 
First of all, as was pointed out earlier investors in the lower deciles are on average 
considerably younger than those in the higher deciles (Figure 22, Appendix A). It should be 
noted that this might affect some of the results I present here. This kind of a pattern is very 
normal. Young people tend to have most of their wealth in the form of human capital that is 
realized over their life cycle as income from work. The excess liquidity is then accumulated 
as savings in different investments. Therefore, the older the person I,s the more she has 
realized the human capital and turned it into the form of investable assets. 
Figure 18 reports the share of males and females in each wealth decile. The share of males 
and females seems to be relatively even across the deciles. This indicates that there are no 
major differences in the distribution of wealth to the different genders despite the fact that 
males have higher wealth on average. Only in the highest decile men have a clear majority. 
 
Figure 18. Share of females and males in the different wealth deciles. 
Also the shares of investors with different risk profiles are reasonably stable across the wealth 
deciles. Return focused category is more popular among the lower deciles than among the 
higher ones. This may be due to the fact introduced earlier that investors in these deciles 
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consist of relatively younger individuals than in the higher deciles. Interestingly the share of 
Safety first investors increases in the middle deciles and decreases toward the high and low-
ends of the distribution. This same finding was made by Alanko (2009). This is also reflected 
in Figure 19 which reports the risky shares of investors at the two dates. The risky share has 
increased in all groups but the figures vary considerably across the deciles and there does not 
seem to be any consistent pattern present. The only distinct observation is that the highest 
decile has a considerably higher risky share than the other deciles even though this is not 
apparent in the risk category choices (Figure 23, Appendix A).  
 
Figure 19. Investors' average risky share on Dec 31, 2008 and Oct 31, 2009. Presented by wealth deciles. 
Lastly, I investigated the average portfolio turnover ratios of the investors in each wealth 
decile (Figure 24, Appendix A). Investors in the low wealth categories seem to have higher 
turnover ratios on average. However, the two outlier groups (<1299 and <34270) mix the 
picture and the overall results seem to indicate that there is no clear connection between 
wealth and turnover. The correlation is weakly negative and not significant enough to provide 
any new evidence. 
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5.4 Regression Analysis 
In addition to the descriptive analysis I conducted in the earlier in the study I will now present 
the results of the regression analysis. Regression analysis provides more accurate information 
of the variables explaining the investor behavior. Regression analysis reveals which factors 
actually have an effect and to which degree on the dependent variables. I conduct linear 
regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS) method to determine the combined effect of 
the previously introduced variables on the dependent variables. As the explanatory variables, 
I use age, gender, risk profile, investment horizon, wealth and portfolio turnover ratio. 
Additionally, I use transformations of certain variables in order to test if I can get better 
explanatory power by doing so. 
I conduct three separate regressions, each with different dependent variables. Firstly, I regress 
the explanatory variables by setting as the dependent variable the difference in the risky share 
between the investor’s true portfolio on December 31, 2008 and the risky share suggested by 
the bank. Secondly, I do the same test by setting as the dependent variable the change in the 
risky share between October 31, 2009 and December 31, 2008.  In the final regression the 
dependent variable is the difference in the risky share as of October 31, 2009 and the one 
suggested by the bank. In other words, first I try to identify variables explaining the difference 
in the share of risky assets chosen by the investor compared to the share given by the bank, 
i.e. what kinds of individuals actually follow the bank’s advice the best in the beginning. In 
the second regression I aim to identify the characteristics of those investors who tend to 
increase the share of risky assets in their portfolios the most during the period. In the last 
regression I test whether the order and importance of the explanatory variables found in the 
first regression still hold at the end of the period. 
5.4.1 OLS Regression – Comparison of the Risky Share in the Initial Allocation 
to the Bank’s Suggestion 
As a dependent variable in the first regression I have the difference in the risky share between 
the initial allocation of the investors and the allocation suggested by the bank. I run the 
regression with the aforementioned independent variables added with squared figure of age 
and a natural logarithm of wealth. This way I hope to get better fit for the model. I try to 
capture the importance of the independent variables in explaining the differences in the 
63 
 
investors’ portfolios to the investment plan provided by the bank. I conduct the regressions by 
adding a single variable at a time and observing how the t-statistic changes. The significance 
of the results is measured by the P-value (in parenthesis). Table 12 reports the results of the 
regressions. 
Table 12. Results of the Linear Regression (OLS). This table reports the results of the ordinary least squares 
regressions between the difference in the risky shares of the investors’ portfolios relative to the bank's suggestions and 
different independent variables. I report the coefficients and the respective p-values in parentheses. *** denotes 
significance at 0,01 level, ** denotes significance at 0,05 level and * denotes significance at 0,1 level. 
 
The results reveal that the most important variable explaining the difference in the risky share 
is the investment horizon. Due to the correlation between risk profile and investment horizon 
it first appears as if the risk profile explained the difference. However, when the investment 
horizon parameter is added the significance of the risk profile disappears. The negative value 
indicates that investors overweight risky assets in the short investment periods and 
underweight them in the long investment horizons. This confirms the findings made in the 
previous sections about the investors’ ignorance of the length of the investment period. 
Age does not have statistical significance in explaining the results. However, I find that by 
adding the Age squared variable the importance of the Age variable decreases and gives a 
negative value for the Age squared. This indicates a tendency of the trend curve being 
parabolic rather than linear. In this case it indicates a convex function meaning that the 
younger the investor the more likely they are having less risky assets than suggested. And the 
tendency to overweight risky assets increases non-linearly with age. This emphasizes the 
Dependend variable = Difference in RS, 2008-bank
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0,0039 0,0068 0,0067 0,0076 0,0062 0,0063 0,0051 0,0049
(0.000)*** (0.151) (0.153) (0.103) (0.099)* (0.095)* (0.185) (0.207)
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
(0.537) (0.536) (0.312) (0.185) (0.182) (0.264) (0.289)
-0,0099 0,0045 0,0169 0,0172 0,0109 0,0117
(0.679) (0.848) (0.377) (0.368) (0.579) (0.550)
-0,1170 -0,0026 -0,0027 -0,0023 -0,0011
(0.000)*** (0.875) (0.874) (0.891) (0.949)
-0,2563 -0,2559 -0,2555 -0,2552
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
(0.411) (0.240) (0.249)
0,0071 0,0064
(0.189) (0.237)
-0,0050
(0.061)*
F-value 24,5 12,43 8,43 15,34 111,83 80,75 80,26 70,86
Prob > F 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
R^2 0,0263 0,0267 0,0269 0,0635 0,3821 0,3852 0,3838 0,3862
Adjusted R^2 0,0252 0,0245 0,0236 0,0593 0,3787 0,3805 0,3790 0,3807
Number of observations 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910
Model
Gender
Age squared
Age
Turnover ratio
Wealth (logaritmic)
Wealth
Investment horizon
Risk profile
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discrepancy between the investment horizon reported by the investors and the true behavior in 
allocating their assets.  
Adding in the parameters for wealth and turnover ratio do not increase the fit of the model, 
they rather decrease it. When adding in the logarithmic wealth variable, it comes up positive 
while the wealth variable stays negative, giving a mixed picture of the direction of effect. 
Neither does the gender variable have any clear direction or significance in the results. 
5.4.2 OLS Regression – Comparison of the Risky Share in the Initial Allocation 
to the Final Allocation 
In the second regression I aim to identify the characteristics of those investors who were the 
most likely to increase the share of risky assets in their portfolios during the studied period. 
The results also indicate which kinds of investors are most likely to deviate from the 
allocation chosen by them initially. 
As a dependent variable I use the change in the risky share between the final allocation and 
the initial allocation. The independent variables used here are same as in the first regression 
model. The results of the regressions are reported in Table 13.  
Table 13. Results of the Linear Regression (OLS). This table reports the results of the ordinary least squares 
regressions between the difference in the risky shares of the investors’ initial and final portfolios and different 
independent variables. I report the coefficients and the respective p-values in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 
0,01 level, ** denotes significance at 0,05 level and * denotes significance at 0,1 level. 
 
Dependend variable = Change in RS, 2009-2008
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-0,0020 -0,0058 -0,0057 -0,0055 -0,0055 -0,0055 -0,0049 -0,0046
(0.000)*** (0.065)* (0.068)* (0.077)* (0.080)* (0.0080)*** (0.129) (0.155)
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
(0.221) (0.224) (0.273) (0.271) (0.272) (0.337) (0.381)
0,0171 0,0201 0,1954 0,0195 0,0228 0,0218
(0.28) (0.206) (0.219) (0.219) (0.164) (0.181)
-0,0245 -0,0296 -0,0296 -0,0298 -0,0313
(0.066)* (0.035)** (0.035)** (0.034)** (0.025)**
0,0115 0,0115 0,0113 0,0109
(0.245) (0.246) (0.255) (0.270)
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
(0.981) (0.788) (0.816)
-0,0038 -0,0029
(0.406) (0.523)
0,0063
(0.005)***
F-value 14,68 8,10 5,79 5,20 4,43 3,69 3,26 3,86
Prob > F 0,0001 0,0003 0,0006 0,0004 0,0005 0,0013 0,0020 0,0002
R^2 0,0159 0,0175 0,0188 0,0225 0,2390 0,0239 0,0247 0,0332
Adjusted R^2 0,0148 0,0154 0,0156 0,0181 0,0185 0,0174 0,0171 0,0246
Number of observations 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910
Wealth
Wealth (logaritmic)
Turnover ratio
Model
Age
Age squared
Gender
Risk profile
Investment horizon
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Risk profile appears to be the major variable explaining the change. The negative coefficient 
indicates that the more risk-averse the investors have reported to be, the more they have 
increased the share of risky assets in their portfolios. Furthermore, the results also indicate a 
significant positive relation with portfolio turnover and the change in the risky share. In 
effect, the more active the investor has been in trading during the period the more likely it is 
that he/she has done so to increase the share of risky assets in the portfolio. 
The results point towards age playing some role in explaining the changes in the allocations. 
The negative value in the Age variable indicates a negative relation with the change in the 
risky share. However, the results are not statistically significant and thus do not have 
explanatory power when all the variables are taken into account. 
There is some indication of a positive relation between gender and the change in the 
allocation, suggesting that males have increased the risky share more than females. Also the 
Investment horizon variable gets modestly positive values indicating that investors with 
longer investment horizons increase the risky share more. However, the results of these two 
variables cannot be considered as statistically significant. Wealth does not seem to have any 
statistically measurable explanatory power. 
5.4.3 OLS Regression – Comparison of the Risky Share in the Final Allocation 
to the Bank’s Suggestion 
In the third regression I test whether the results found in the first regression explaining the 
difference in the investors’ initial allocations to the bank’s suggestion still hold at the end of 
period. This time I set the difference in the risky share between final allocation and the bank’s 
suggestion as the dependent variable. To explain the dependent variable I use the same 
independent variables as in the previous regressions. I report the results of the regressions in 
Table 14. 
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Table 14. Results of the Linear Regression (OLS). This table reports the results of the ordinary least squares 
regressions between the difference in the risky shares of the investors’ portfolios relative to the bank's suggestions and 
different independent variables. I report the coefficients  and the respective p-values in parentheses. *** denotes 
significance at 0,01 level, ** denotes significance at 0,05 level and * denotes significance at 0,1 level. 
 
As in the first regression I find also this time the Investment horizon variable explaining most 
of the difference. The magnitude as well as the direction and significance are at the same level 
as in the first regression. The second most important explanatory variable appears to be Risk 
profile. The negative relation implies that investors in the more risk-averse categories hold 
more risky assets than they should and vice versa with investors in the less risk-averse 
categories. This has changed from the situation at the beginning of the investment period 
where the Risk profile was only weakly negative and did not have any significance after the 
Investment horizon variable was added. However, now the Risk profile variable has more 
explanatory power and it stays significant even after adding the Risk profile variable. The 
conclusion of this is that even though at the beginning investors ignored the investment time 
period but hold on to their risk profile, they have now stopped following the risk profile as 
well. 
The gender variable has more significance than before but as the results reveal this is mostly 
attributable to the variables mentioned above, i.e. Risk profile and Investment horizon. 
However, the variable has strengthened indicating that males are more likely to have a higher 
risky share relative to the suggested figure now than before. This supports the finding in the 
second regression that males were slightly more likely to increase the risky share more than 
females during the period. 
Dependend variable = Difference in RS, 2009-bank
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0,0019 0,0010 0,0010 0,0020 0,0007 0,0008 0,0002 0,0003
(0.012)** (0.826) (0.821) (0.643) (0.835) (0.821) (0.945) (0.931)
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
(0.837) (0.839) (0.773) (0.660) (0.653) (0.733) (0.722)
0,0072 0,0246 0,0364 0,0367 0,0338 0,0336
(0.750) (0.265) (0.041)** (0.039)** (0.066)* (0.068)*
-0,1414 -0,0322 -0,0323 -0,0321 -0,0324
(0.000)*** (0.040)** (0.040)** (0.041)** (0.040)**
-0,2448 -0,2444 -0,2442 -0,2443
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
(0.389) (0.308) (0.305)
0,0034 0,0036
(0.504) (0.484)
0,0012
(0.625)
F-value 6,37 3,20 2,17 16,35 117,98 98,42 84,37 73,79
Prob > F 0,0118 0,0412 0,0905 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
R^2 0,0070 0,0070 0,0071 0,6740 0,3949 0,3954 0,3957 0,3958
Adjusted R^2 0,0059 0,0048 0,0038 0,0633 0,3915 0,3914 0,3910 0,3905
Number of observations 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910
Wealth
Wealth (logaritmic)
Turnover ratio
Model
Age
Age squared
Gender
Risk profile
Investment horizon
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The relations that existed between the variables measuring age and the difference in the risky 
shares have also changed from the beginning. The Age variable is still positive but only very 
weakly and its significance has also diminished. Furthermore, the Age squared variable has 
also weakened and lost its significance. The same has happened with Wealth and Wealth 
(logarithmic) that do not seem to have explanatory power as they didn’t before.  
6 Findings and Conclusions 
6.1 Findings 
My aim in this research was to investigate the behavior of Finnish private investors by 
examining how well they follow the investment advice given by their bank. The bank has 
mapped each investor’s risk attitude and purpose of the investment in order to form a picture 
of the most suitable asset allocation for the individuals. Based on the information about the 
bank’s suggestions and the investors’ true portfolio allocations I was able to investigate the 
characteristics of those investors not following the bank’s advice and find out patterns in the 
investors’ behavior.  I addressed the question by forming six hypotheses, which were 
analyzed in a dataset of 910 individuals. The results of the hypotheses are summarized in 
Table 15. 
Table 15. Summary of the results. A “+”-sign indicates support for the hypothesis. A “-“-sign indicates that the 
hypothesis is rejected based on the results. 
 
I find clear evidence that the investors’ risk-taking behavior can be predicted by their 
individual risk attitudes. This is consistent with the study by Alanko (2009) where he found 
statistically significant relation between risk taking and risk profiles. I find similarly that 
investors who say to be risk-averse also have a lower share of investments in risky assets than 
those saying to be less risk-averse. Thus, the risky share increases with risk profile in my 
Hypotheses Outcome
Previous 
studies
Hypothesis 1: Risk taking behavior can be predicted by individual risk attitude + +
Hypothesis 2: Risk taking behavior can be predicted by investment horizon - + and -
Hypothesis 3: Risk tolerance decreases with age - +
Hypothesis 4: Men are more risk tolerant than women + +
Hypothesis 5: Higher wealth implies increased risk  tolerance - +
Hypothesis 6: Risk taking behavior may change over time + +
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sample. Interestingly, when compared to the bank’s suggestions investors in the low-risk 
category overweight risky assets and the ones in the high-risk category underweight risky 
assets. The middle group investors also first underweight risky assets but then shift to 
overweight during the period. The results were consistent over time although the relative 
differences between the risk profile categories decreased from the initial allocation to the final 
allocation. The decrease in the relative differences was caused by a relatively higher increase 
of risky share in the portfolios of investors belonging to the lower risk categories. In effect, 
those investors with less equities at the beginning of the period increased the share of them 
more than those who initially had higher share of equities. It seems that the positive 
performance in the stock market made the more risk-averse investors more willing to accept 
the risks involved. 
The second hypothesis assumed that investors’ risk-taking behavior could be predicted by the 
investment horizon. I do not find evidence supporting this hypothesis. Based on my data it 
seems that the investors clearly ignore the length of the investment when making allocation 
decisions. I find that the investment horizon is statistically the most significant variable in 
explaining the differences in the share of risky assets in investors’ portfolios relative to the 
allocation suggested by the bank. When examining the investors’ investment horizons, I find 
that they follow a pattern where the investment horizon decreases with age. This supports the 
traditional life-cycle hypothesis and the life-cycle investing models. However, there is a 
discrepancy between what the investors say that is their investment horizon and what their 
actions actually are. Figures about the true allocations reveal that there is no connection 
between the share of risky assets in investors’ portfolios and the length of the investment. The 
bank’s suggested allocation in fact depends more on the length of the investment than on the 
investment profile. Regardless of this, the investors do not seem to recognize the fact but 
choose to rely more on their individual investment profile in the allocation decision. Investors 
strongly overweight risky assets in the short horizon categories and respectively underweight 
those assets in the long horizon categories. This continued through the period although the 
average risky shares rose in all of the categories. 
I find only some evidence of risk tolerance decreasing with age. When measuring the risky 
share of the initial allocations I find that the figures rise up to a certain age and then start to 
decrease. There is weak but visible concavity in the function similarly as Riley and Chow 
(1992), Hallahan et al. (2004) and Alanko (2009) report in their studies. However, the 
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situation changes during the period and when examining the final allocations I find that the 
pattern has changed. The share of risky assets has increased somewhat more among the 
younger investors than with older ones. Thus the distribution becomes more downward 
sloping and the concavity disappears. However, the negative correlation between the risky 
share and age actually strengthens. In the regression analysis age did not have statistical 
explanatory power when testing the variables against the change in the risky share during the 
period. I also did not find statistical evidence of age being a major explanatory variable 
regarding the deviations in the risky shares from the bank’s suggestion. 
I find evidence of males being more risk tolerant than females as investors. Males dominate 
the high-risk risk profile categories whereas females have a majority in the low-risk 
categories. During the period men also hold consistently more risky assets in their portfolios 
than females in all of the different risk profile categories. Males are also more active in 
trading. These findings are not very surprising and they are consistent with the existing 
research (e.g. Dohmen et al., 2005; Hallahan et al., 2004; Alanko, 2009). I do not find gender 
having much significance in explaining the differences in the risky shares between investors’ 
portfolios and bank’s suggestions. In this regard, males and females seem to follow the bank’s 
advice in a similar manner. Males appear to increase the risky share during period slightly 
more than females supporting the hypothesis of males being more aggressive as investors. 
However, the statistical evidence for this is not very strong. 
The results regarding investors’ wealth (as in investment wealth here) are not clear enough to 
support my hypothesis of risk tolerance increasing with wealth. It seems that investors in the 
highest wealth decile have on average higher share of investments in risky assets but the 
pattern is not as clear with the other deciles. The results indicate that investors in the middle 
deciles are the most risk-averse in terms of risk profiles and average risky shares. These 
results are consistent with Riley and Chow (1992), Hallahan et al. (2004) and Alanko’s 
(2009) where they find of wealth explaining investors’ risk attitudes. However, when 
investigating the significance of wealth in explaining the differences between investors’ true 
risky shares and bank’s suggestions I do not find any clear relation. Regardless of the 
amounts, investors seem to behave fairly similarly when choosing the allocation for their 
assets relative to the bank’s suggestions. The results of the regressions are mixed and do not 
give any significant indication of wealth having an effect on the way investors change their 
allocations over the period. 
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Finally, I can say that I find support for the last hypothesis regarding the changes in the 
investors’ risk taking behavior. I find evidence of investors trying to actively increase the 
risky share of assets in their portfolios and certain types of investors making distinctively 
different changes in their allocations. These findings point to disposition effect, investor 
myopia and market timing attempts. It seems that investors ignore the investment horizons 
and engage in apparent attempts of market timing by actively shifting allocation towards a 
more risky weighting during the period, regardless of their initial investment plan. On an 
aggregate level, the net purchases of equities were positive whereas the net purchases of other 
assets were negative. I find the young and initially most risk-averse investors being most 
likely to increase the share of risky assets during the period. The evidence reveals that those 
with the lowest equity exposure were most likely to increase it more than those investors who 
already at the beginning had a higher share of assets in equities. Also the younger investors 
seem to have a tendency for more aggressive allocation changes. 
6.2 Conclusions 
I study the way a major Finnish retail bank gives investment advice to its private clients based 
on the data it gathers in its investment profile tool. The tool is linked to the requirements the 
MiFID regulations impose on banks. I investigate how well the investors actually follow the 
bank’s advice by comparing the asset allocations suggested by the bank to the ones chosen by 
the investors. The bank’s advice about the allocation is based on two main variables: the 
investor’s individual investment horizon and risk profile. I first investigate how the investors’ 
initial allocations match those suggested by the bank and then test whether the allocations 
have changed in ten months time. In addition to the investment horizon and risk profile I 
focus on explaining the differences in the allocations by the following demographic variables: 
age, gender and wealth. I also study the significance of trading activity in explaining the 
results. 
The main findings of the research are following. Firstly, I find clear evidence of investors 
discarding the length of their investment horizons when making allocation decisions. The 
results show that the share of assets in risky investments does not increase with the 
investment horizon. On average investors choose the investment horizon so that it decreases 
with age, which is consistent with the assumptions of the traditional life cycle hypothesis and 
life cycle investing concept. However, when investigating their true allocations there is no 
consistency between the share of risky assets and the length of the investment horizon. When 
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compared to the allocations suggested by the bank the investors seem to heavily overweight 
risky assets in short investment horizons and oppositely underweight them in the long 
investment horizons. Investors seem to consider the advice regarding their individual risk 
profiles as much more important than the length of the investment period. This finding 
strongly supports the previous research on investors’ myopic behavior by Mehra and Prescott 
(1985), Benartzi & Thaler (1995) and Thaler et al. (1997) where they conclude that investors 
make investment decisions on much shorter intervals than they should. The more frequently 
investors monitor their investments the more it affects their perceptions of risk even if the 
actual investment horizon was much longer. 
In addition to the myopic behavior I find evidence of disposition effect and market timing 
attempts by the investors. There was a major shift in the portfolios toward more risky 
allocation during the period. Even though this was mainly due to a positive performance in 
the stock market during the period, by investigating the investors’ trades I found evidence of 
them actively increasing the weight of equities in their portfolios. I find portfolio turnover 
ratio being a statistically significant variable in explaining the relative increase of risky assets 
in investors’ portfolios. Also the aggregate net purchases of equities were strongly positive 
whereas the net purchases of other assets were negative.  
Furthermore, some of the investors appeared to have increased the share of risky assets 
considerably more than others. The main characteristics of those investors included risk-
averse risk profile and high trading activity. I found a significant negative relation between 
the increase in the share of risky assets and risk profile. This means that those customers who 
had reported to be as most risk-averse were likely to increase the share of risky assets more 
than those with higher reported risk tolerance. Also trading activity, measured by portfolio 
turnover ratio had a statistically significant positive effect on the increase of risky assets. 
Thus, those investors who were most aggressive with their allocation decisions also were 
most active in buying and selling securities. 
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6.3 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research 
Because my data was gathered from the databases of the bank there are some limitations to 
the study that could be addressed in further research. First of all, as the data about the 
investors’ risk profiles and investment horizons is based on the results of a series of questions 
there might be some bias in the answers of the investors. For example, the interpretation of 
the questions regarding the ability to tolerate risk may vary across age groups. Also the 
investment advisors may cause some bias in the results by their actions. It is crucial that the 
investment advisors are able to explain the customer what is meant by risk in the questions. 
Secondly, the data includes only assets kept in this bank. Of course, investors might have 
several bank relations and assets also in other banks. These assets in other banks cannot be 
taken into account in this study. However, the figures concerning the investors’ holdings in 
this bank are very accurate because they are true figures that were retrieved from the bank’s 
databases and not drawn from a survey. 
Furthermore, due to numerous complications with combining the data there are only 910 
individuals included in the sample. This causes some problems when interpreting the data. 
The sample group is in some cases too small to produce statistically reliable results even 
though it is large enough to elicit certain information with high significance. The small 
sample size was basically the cost of having longitude in the data. I had to exclude a high 
amount of completed risk profiles in order to find get those that were suitable for this 
research.  
Despite these limitations, this study adds new important evidence about the behavior of 
investors and the functioning of the banks’ risk profiling methods under the MiFID 
regulations. I manage to provide a new dimension of investment horizon into the existing 
research and include longitude in the data for the first time regarding this topic. Later on when 
the investment profile tools have been used long enough in banks, I believe it is possible to 
replicate this study with higher number of individuals, more longitude and new variables. 
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8 Appendices 
8.1 Appendix A – Graphs and Tables 
 
Table 16. Regional weights in investors' portfolios on December 31, 2008 and the performance of the index over the 
period until October31, 2009. Total performance is the weighted return of the indexes. 
 
 
Figure 20. Average risky share (RS) of investments on Dec 31, 2008. 
Region Weights Performance
Global equities 23,6 % 13,2 %
Finnish equities 44,6 % 25,2 %
European equities 12,1 % 12,9 %
North American equities 5,2 % 15,5 %
Japanese equities 1,3 % 10,6 %
Emerging market equities 13,2 % 51,9 %
Total performance 23,7 %
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Figure 21. Average risky share (RS) of investments on Oct 31, 2009 
 
Figure 22. Distribution of investors by age into wealth deciles. 
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Figure 23. Share of investors with different risk profiles in each wealth decile. 
 
Figure 24. Portfolio turnover ratios of investors in different wealth deciles. 
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8.2 Appendix B – Investment Profile Questionnaire 
 
Wealth and income 
 
1) Estimate of income  
 
Net income / year  __________________________ euros 
 
2) Estimate of expenses 
 
Expenses / year __________________________ euros 
 
Additional information (e.g. Interest expenses on loans): 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3) Estimate of wealth 
 
Note: Mutual funds are divided, according to their type, into equity, balanced and fixed 
income funds. Please put your fund assets in the table below – for example, as follows:  
Equity funds: put all under ”Equity investments”.  
Balanced funds: put 50 % under ”Equity investments” and 50 % under ”Fixed income 
investments”.   
 
 Market value, euros 
 
Equity investments 
 
________________________________________
 
Fixed income investments 
 
________________________________________
 
Money market investments 
 
________________________________________
 
Alternative investments 
 
________________________________________
 
Accounts and deposits 
 
________________________________________
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4) Estimate of fixed assets and other wealth 
 
 Market value, euros 
 
Own apartment 
 
________________________________________
 
Leisure-time apartment    
 
________________________________________
 
Investment apartment 
 
________________________________________
 
Forest and land  
 
________________________________________
 
Share of deceased’s estate 
 
________________________________________
 
Own company 
 
________________________________________
 
Other, what? 
 
________________________________________
 
 
5) Estimate of debts  
 
Total debts ____________________euros  
 
 
6) Regular additional income needed from investments 
 
Regular additional income needed from investments ___________________ euros.  
 
Additional information (e.g. monthly, quarterly) 
_______________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7) Loss tolerance  
The loss tolerance is an assessment of how sensitive your financial situation is to fluctuations 
in asset values. Please select the alternative below that best describes your loss tolerance. 
 
Small - your financial situation will not tolerate large losses. 
 
Moderate - your financial situation will tolerate moderate losses. 
 
Large - your financial situation is not sensitive to investment-related risks and 
will withstand even large losses. 
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8) Experience and knowledge of investment products 
 
How would you rate your experience and knowledge of the investment product properties, 
such as risks, listed below? 
 
 Knowledge Number of transactions in 
last 5 years 
Summary of 
experience and 
knowledge 
Discretionary asset 
management agreement 
 
 
No 
  
Yes 
 Fewer 
than 2  
 More 
than 2  
 
No  Yes 
Low-risk fixed income 
products and funds 
 
 
No 
  
Yes 
 Fewer 
than 2  
 More 
than 2  
 
No  Yes 
Other fixed income 
products, funds and 
equities 
 
 
No 
  
Yes 
 Fewer 
than 2  
 More 
than 2  
 
No  Yes 
Structured products 
 
 
No 
  
Yes 
 Fewer 
than 2  
 More 
than 2  
 
No  Yes 
Warrants and convertible 
bonds 
 
 
No 
  
Yes 
 Fewer 
than 2  
 More 
than 2  
 
No  Yes 
Private equity funds, risk 
and hedge investments 
 
 
No 
  
Yes 
 Fewer 
than 2  
 More 
than 2  
 
No  Yes 
 
Any other information: 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
9) Investment objectives and investment horizon 
 
Your main goals and objectives: 
 
We are interested in your goals and objectives because they help us to plan the management 
of your wealth better. Please explain your main goals and objectives in more detail below. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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For how long time period do you estimate to invest your assets? 
 
Maximum 2 years 
  
2 – 5 years 
 
5 – 15 years 
 
Over 15 years 
 
 
10) Risk profile 
 
How would you characterise yourself as an investor? 
 
Safety first. As an investor you focus on taking care and securing your assets 
on the long term. You are ready to accept the low value fluctuations and low 
risk of losses that are inherent in the pursuit for returns. 
  
Value-minded. As an investor you focus on the controlled growth of your 
assets. You are ready to accept the risk of moderate value fluctuations and 
losses that are inherent in the pursuit for returns. 
 
Return-focused. As an investor you focus on the rapid growth of your assets. 
You are ready to accept the risk of large value fluctuations and losses that are 
inherent in the pursuit for high returns. 
 
 
Other information (e.g. activity as an investor, and willingness to participate in investment 
activities): 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
85 
 
8.3 Appendix C – Questions for Determining the Risk Profile 
The risk profile can be found out with these questions (only in Finnish) 
 
 
 
Suhtautuminen sijoittamiseen liittyviin riskeihin 1/6
Onko mahdollista, että tarvitset sijoitettavaksi suunnitellut varat käyttöösi jo 
ennen tavoiteajan loppua?
Vastausvaihtoehdot
1 Kyllä
2 Ehkä
3 Ei
Suhtautuminen sijoittamiseen liittyviin riskeihin 2/6
Vastausvaihtoehdot
1 Suuri merkitys. Tarvitsen näitä varoja jokapäiväiseen elämiseen.
2 Kohtalainen merkitys. Saatan tarvita näitä varoja jokapäiväiseen elämiseen.
3 Pieni merkitys. En tarvitse näitä varoja jokapäiväiseen elämiseen.
Mikä on sijoitettavaksi suunniteltujen varojen merkitys taloudellisen tilanteesi 
näkökulmasta sekä tavoiteajan lopussa että sitä ennen?
Suhtautuminen sijoittamiseen liittyviin riskeihin 3/6
Mitä odotat sijoitukseltasi?
Vastausvaihtoehdot
1 Haluan turvata sijoitukseni merkittävältä arvonvaihtelulta. Samalla hyväksyn, että sijoitukseni 
tuotto voi jäädä matalaksi.
2 Sijoitukseni arvon tulisi kasvaa vähitellen. Samalla hyväksyn, että arvonvaihtelu sijoitusaikana 
on maltillista.
3 Tavoittelen sijoitukselleni pitkällä aikavälillä korkeaa tuottoa. Samalla hyväksyn, että 
korkeamman tuoton tavoitteluun kuuluu voimakas arvonvaihtelu.
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Suhtautuminen sijoittamiseen liittyviin riskeihin 4/6
Vastausvaihtoehdot
1 Vaihtoehto 1
2 Vaihtoehto 2
3 Vaihtoehto 3
Alla oleva kuvassa esitetään kolmen eri sijoitusvaihtoehdon kehitys. Tarkastele 
oletettuja tuottoja ja arvonvaihteluja. Minkä sijoitusvaihtoehdon valitsisit, jotta 
voit nukkua yösi rauhassa?
Suhtautuminen sijoittamiseen liittyviin riskeihin 5/6
Vastausvaihtoehdot
1 Vaihtoehto 1
2 Vaihtoehto 2
3 Vaihtoehto 3
Jos saisit vaihtoehtoiset sijoitussuositukset tavoitteellesi, joihin liittyy alla 
olevan kuvan mukaiset tuottojen vaihtelut, minkä sijoitusvaihtoehdon valitsisit?
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Suhtautuminen sijoittamiseen liittyviin riskeihin 6/6
Vastausvaihtoehdot
1 Myyn sijoitukseni. Sijoitusteni arvo voi vielä laskea ja haluan välttyä lisätappioilta.
2 Seuraan tilannetta, mutta en myy sijoituksiani. Vaikka sijoitusteni arvo on laskenut, uskon 
arvon nousevan pitkällä aikavälillä.
3 En huolestuisi asiasta. Uskon, että voimakas arvonvaihtelu kuuluu olennaisesti paremman 
tuoton tavoitteluun. Näen tilanteen lisäostojen mahdollisuutena.
Jos sijoituksesi arvo laskee lyhyessä ajassa 20%, mitä teet?
